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Paul R. Tremblayt
I. Introduction
Lawyers have permission to reveal the intended criminal activity
of clients.' They may even, on occasion, have permission to reveal
the past criminal activity of clients.2 This Article explores whether
t B.A. (1973), Boston College; J.D. (1978), U.C.L.A. School of Law. The author is
an Assistant Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. The author wishes to thank
Jennifer Shea for her tireless and inspired research assistance, and his colleagues George Fisher,
Judy McMorrow, and Dick Huber for their helpful comments. The author takes responsibility
for all errors. He would also like to thank Bob Cornish of the American Journal of TrialAdvocacy
for inviting him to write about this perplexing topic.
1. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1980); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1992).
2. Although it is well-established that the only generalized exceptions to the ethical obligation
of confidentiality, see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNSimLrY DR 4-101 (1980); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rule 1.6 (1992), and the evidentiary attorney-client privilege,
see, e.g., UNIF. R. EvID. 502, are for intended, i.e., future crimes or frauds, in some contexts
lawyers may, or even must, reveal past, completed crimes or frauds perpetrated by their clients
and learned by the lawyer in the course of the representation. For example, in Model Code
jurisdictions which have not adopted the "except clause" to DR 7-102(B)(1), lawyers must
reveal "fraud [by a client] upon a person or tribunal." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1970); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992) ("noisy withdrawal" might be a lawyer's duty when
faced with client misconduct, trumping Model Rule 1.6); Randy Samforn, 'Noisy Withdrawal'
Held a Duty, NAT'L L.J. Jan. 18, 1993, at 3. The Massachusetts Bar Association's Committee
on Professional Ethics has determined that, regardless of the reading of DR 7-102(B)(1), lawyers
must reveal past perjury if doing so is necessary to prevent a client from repeating that perjury.
See Mass. Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Op. 89-1, reprinted in 74 MASS. L. REV. 114
(1989).
Professor Harry Subin has also argued that in some contexts lawyers may be required by
a tribunal to reveal past crimes under the attorney-client privilege's "crime/fraud" exception.
See Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm,
70 IowA L. REv. 1091, 1112-18 (1985).
The OPM and Kaye Scholer scandals, where lawyers have been accused of wrongdoing
and have settled cases for many millions of dollars after they refused to disclose ongoing client
fraud, may also serve as examples of an increasing willingness to recognize that lawyers' obliga-
tions are not restricted to purely future activity. See generally In re OPM Leasing Servs., Inc.
(Report of the Trustee Concerning Fraud and Other Misconduct in the Management of the
Affairs of the Debtor) [hereinafter OPM Trustee Report], reprinted in GEOFFREY C. HAZARD,
JR. & SusAN P. KONIAK, THE LAw AND Enucs OF LAWYERING 255-71 (1990) (discussing
AMEC.,AN JOURNAL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY
lawyers have permission, or ought to have permission, to arrange
deliberately to learn about or to document client criminal activity so
as to reveal the information to authorities, while concealing that process
from their clients. I argue that they should not have that permission.
This effort to establish an ethics-based prohibition on what I will
refer to as, for want of a more elegant word or phrase, "ratting, ' 3 may
appear to be an easy task. It may appear to be the setting up of the
frailest of straw persons, only to demonstrate the straw's frailties. I
hope this is true. I fear it is not, though, because the phenomenon of
ratting is gaining prevalence; it has at least one source of support in
legal ethics literature4 without any contrary publication as of yet;5 and
ratting has been consistently supported, even if begrudgingly, by the
courts which have confronted it.6 Ratting also has some conceptual
attractiveness, in light of the principles stated in the first two sentences
of this section,7 as well as some potential moral attractiveness as dis-
cussed below.8 The straw person therefore needs to be dismantled.
and criticizing the attorneys' role in the OPM incident); Stephanie B. Goldberg, Kaye Scholer:
The Tremors Continue, 78 A.B.A. J., July 1992, at 50 (discussing various legal and ethical
issues raised in the Kaye Scholer incident); Symposium, In the Matter ofKaye, Scholer, Fierman,
Hays & Handler: A Symposium on Government Regulation, Lawyers' Ethics, and the Rule
of Law, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 977 (1993).
3. I have rejected the use of the term "whistleblowing" as a less obviously loaded sobriquet
for the deliberate arrangement of knowledge of criminal activity, because "whistleblowing"
implies an innocence or an inadvertence on the part of the lawyer which is absent in the ratting
examples. The distinction between whistleblowing and ratting, in fact, serves primarily as
my argument against the latter and in support of the former.
4. See H. Richard Uviller, Presumed Guilty: The Court of Appeals Versus Scott Turow,
136 U. PA. L. REv. 1879 (1988); see also Christopher J. Shine, Note, Deception and Lawyers:
Away from a Dogmatic Principle and Toward a Moral Understanding of Deception, 64 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 722 (1989) (somewhat apologetic about Turow's involvement in ratting
arrangements).
5. But see Cathy B. Peterson, Comment, Defense Attorneys As Government Informants:
Strangers in a Strange Land?, 5 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 619 (1989). This student comment critical
of the United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1987),
holding might serve as an example of contrary authority, but it is concerned more with the
constitutional implications of Ofshe than with the ethical implications, and thus does not argue
that ratting is unethical. Id.
6. See cases discussed infra notes 27-102.
7. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 176-82.
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I suspect that for most thoughtful observers the idea of ratting on
clients is, at least viscerally, a disquieting one. In the several reported
cases where ratting has played a part in a criminal proceeding, most
courts-while usually upholding convictions and indictments-have
included in their opinions language reflecting annoyance to outrage at
the lawyers' betrayal of client trust. The opinions have described the
ratting as "sleazy,"9 "reprehensible,"10 "shocking,"'1 "astonishing,"'
and "bizarre."' 3 Courts which have resorted to less colorful descriptions
still frequently stress that they do not condone betrayal of trust as a
crime-fighting strategy.14 Those courts, as noted, permit the activity,
but ruefully.
At the same time, the idea of whistleblowing, in contrast to ratting,
is not nearly as disliked. Lawyers who fail or refuse to "blow the whistle"
and report ongoing misconduct of their clients in order to spare harm
to innocent third parties are frequently skewered in commentary. 5
9. United States v. Noons, Criminal No. H-89-92, at 11 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 1991).
10. United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508, 1516 n.6 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
963 (1987).
11. United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507, 1512 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
12. Id. at 1520.
13. Id. at 1522.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 367, 101 S. Ct. 665, 669, 66 L.
Ed. 2d 564, 569 (1981) ("[W]e do not condone the egregious behavior of the Government
agents.'); United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182, 1186-87 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that interference
with attorney-client relationship "not condoned" but not a constitutional violation); United States
v. Glover, 596 F.2d 857, 864 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[Wle do not condone the behavior" of agents
interfering with the attorney-client relationship.); cf. United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462,
1465 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 898 (1987) ("[Wle do not necessarily condone" use
of prostitute who then engaged in a sustained sexual relationship with the defendant.).
Amid some controversy, the United States Department of Justice has continued to stress
that United States Attorneys lawfully and ethically may use informants (although not necessarily
lawyer informants) as a proper means through which to conduct criminal investigations,
notwithstanding a possible infringement thereby on the rights of the accused to assistance of
counsel. See 5 ABA/BNA MANUAL OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT No. 25, at 427-28 (Jan. 3,
1990) (discussing the controversy surrounding the "Thornburg memorandum'); see also Cris
Carmody, US. Judge's Opinion: Justice Department Rules Trump State Ethics, NAT'L LJ.
Mar. 1, 1993, at 7. The Department of Justice policy reflected the decision of the Second Circuit
in United States v. Hammad, 846 F.2d 854, modified, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988) (allowing
latitude in the use of informants as a legitimate investigative technique "authorized by law').
15. See, e.g., OPM Trustee Report, supra note 2, at 266-70; DAvID LUBAN, LAwYERS
AND JusTICE: AN ETICAL STUDY 206-17 (1988) (criticizing the Ford Pinto episode and the
lawyers' failure to warn officials who might have insured the auto's safety). For a discussion
1993]
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY
I suggest that the two skewerings are not at all inconsistent, and that
one may defend and promote whistleblowing while rejecting ratting.
The difference, it seems, rests on the manner in which the lawyer
approaches the disclosures, the level of honesty which accompanies
the lawyer's efforts, and the degree of manipulation involved in the
relationship.
In ratting, but usually not in whistleblowing, the lawyer orchestrates
the revelation of information and preserves it in a way that will be helpful
to a prosecutor. The second, and possibly more significant, concern
is that ratting implies a deceit which I argue the profession ought to
condemn. Although it is hard to find articulated support for such a
proposal, justified whistleblowing must include discussion and dialogue
with, and revelation to, one's client before or simultaneous with one's
revelation. Ratting, on the other hand, inherently includes deception
of the client in order to capture the incriminating information or deceptive-
ly to use previously learned information. It is that behavior which I
criticize here. Dishonesty is always enormously suspect, morally, and
requires great justification and burden of proof which, I argue, is not
met. In addition, two accompanying concerns arise from the dishonesty
and betrayal. The first is a deontological concern about exploiting
intimacy. The second is a more utilitarian complaint that a failure to
condemn ratting poses a risk to the profession in its effort to sustain
trust between lawyers and clients. Using Professor Robert Burt's theories,
this Article demonstrates that encouragement of dialogue within a morally
activist and victim-sensitive practice will foster trust while substantially
accomplishing the aims of ratting.
Part Il of this Article canvasses briefly the stories of ratting as reported
in judicial opinions and elsewhere in order to demonstrate both the
increasing prevalence and the contexts of this attorney-client interaction.
of statutes intended to encourage whistleblowing, see Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer as
Whistleblower: Confidentiality and the Government Lawyer, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETncs 291 (1991);
Robert G. Vaugn, Statutory Protection of Whistleblowers in the Federal Executive Branch,
1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 615; see also Stephen Gillers, Protecting Lawyers Who Just Say No,
5 GA. ST. U.L. REv. 1 (1988) (defending lawyers who may have to betray corporate clients).
But see Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 493 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that "[tihe better
rule... [is] that attorneys have no duty to 'blow the whistle' on their clients").
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Part I reviews the law16 applicable to ratting, most notably the constitu-
tional principles implicated in a lawyer's assistance of a prosecution
against his client. Part III shows that precedent, and to some extent
logic, supports the conclusion that ratting done well does not inescapably
contravene constitutional or other doctrinally established protections,
even if there are important contrary arguments. My purpose being more
ethical than legal, I do not try to establish the contrary arguments but
note them and their record of nonsuccess in courts. Part IV then takes
up the ethical questions, which are the primary purpose here. That Part
first explains how one might try to justify ratting using conventional
positivist professional responsibility guidelines, and how one might try
to justify the conduct using moral principles which the profession ought
to embrace. Both of those arguments fail, I argue. I then articulate
my moral objections to the practice and the necessity for a concerted
and principled rejection of it by the bar.
II. Reported Ratting: The Cases
Before I offer a glimpse into the lives of ratting lawyers and ratted-
upon clients, I think it is instructive to consider the guises in which
this behavior might arise. The reported cases inevitably involve a lawyer
taking information disclosed by a client, who seemingly trusts the lawyer
not to exploit the confidence,17 and communicating that information
to a prosecutor or government agent who uses it, perhaps indirectly,
16. Some readers of an earlier draft of this Article have appropriately questioned the
legitimacy of a"law-ethics" distinction. They recognize, correctly it seems, that in professional
responsibility matters there is as much "law" in the ethics standards as in the statutory, regulatory,
or constitutional mandates. See, e.g., STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS
OF LAw AND EmIcs 1-6 (3d ed. 1992). As the text makes clear, this Article refers to "law"
as the strain of doctrine which might be implicated in the ratted-upon defendant's trial, whether
evidentiary or constitutional, and which might affect the validity of any indictment or conviction.
See infra Part III. In contrast, I refer to "ethics" as that strain of doctrine which governs whether
the lawyer, subject to governing professional standards, is permitted to act in a certain manner.
See infra Part IV. The distinction is both awkward and crude, but I find it helpful. It is also
a distinction used in effect by Richard Uviller in his discussion of this topic. See Uviller, supra
note 4, at 1883, 1887.
17. The word "confidence" is used here in its lay meaning and not necessarily in the manner
in which it is employed by the Model Code, where it refers to information protected by the
attorney-client privilege. See MODEL CODE OF PROFeSSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A)
(1980).
1993]
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in a prosecution of the client. In some rare instances the same lawyer
then is retained to represent the client in the ensuing prosecution, the
client being unaware of the lawyer's role in its origin."8 In other cases
the lawyer remains as counsel on unrelated matters while feeding the
information to the state.19 In such cases, the lawyer may need to
maintain the ongoing relationship in order effectively to acquire the
incriminating information promised to the prosecutor.
More frequently, ratting cases involve a lawyer using information
about former clients. In these cases, the lawyer will either provide
information he2° already has2 ' or reestablish contact with a client
in order to collect incriminating statements or evidence. 2
Also, in virtually every reported instance of ratting the lawyer himself
is under suspicion or indictment for criminal activity, often separate
from that of the client. This fact makes it easier to object to the ratting;
positive law 23 as well as ethical principles u are apt to hold that such
an exploitation for personal benefit is simply unacceptable. Although
we might possibly reject ratting on that ground alone, I suggest that
relying upon this reasoning is insufficient for the purpose of this Article.
Although I describe cases where lawyers are in deep trouble and turn
in their clients for their own benefit, I critique ratting from a perspective
which assumes that the lawyer has only noble motives-say, ending
the epidemic of drugs, or otherwise "fighting crime." It is significant
18. See United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
19. See United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508, (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963
(1987).
20. Throughout this Article, the pronouns "he," "his," and "him" are employed almost
exclusively. This is done not so much for convenience, although that benefit is certainly achieved,
but because the ratting behavior which has been reported is inevitably conducted by male lawyers.
It also appears, as described below, that the moral reasoning which tends to support ratting
is in many ways "male" in its approach. See infra Part IV.C.2.
21. See, e.g., United States v. White, 879 F.2d 1509, 1510 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1027 (1990).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Arteaga, 807 F.2d 424, 425 (5th Cir. 1986).
23. See, e.g., REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1957).
24. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.7(b) (1992) (stating a
lawyer may not represent a client where that representation is limited by the lawyer's own
interests).
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that "noble ratting"' is nowhere to be found in the literature, but given
my attention to the similarities between whistleblowing and ratting,26
it is of some importance that I establish that all ratting as I have defined
it is offensive to the principles to which lawyers must adhere.
The most prominent of the ratting cases has to be United States v.
Ofshe.27 In Ofshe, celebrated author Scott Turow, while serving as
a prosecutor for the United States Attorney's office in Chicago, arranged
for a lawyer secretly to record the conversations of one of his clients.
2 8
Ofshe is unusual in the annals of ratting. The lawyer involved, Marvin
Glass, remained as counsel to Ronald Ofshe in criminal proceedings
related to Ofshe's drug trafficking business while at the same time he
employed a "Nagra body bug" to preserve evidence about Ofshe's other
drug activities.29 Glass agreed to perform this prosecutorial favor as
part of his negotiations with the Cook County, Illinois, "Operation
Greylord" investigation, of which Turow was a part.30
Glass had a co-counsel, one Mel Black, in his defense of Ofshe in
Florida, and Black was kept uninformed about Glass' dealings with
Turow, as was the presiding judge in that proceeding.31 When the
presiding judge eventually learned of Glass' double agent role, he ordered
withdrawal (still without informing Black); Glass was able to appeal
that withdrawal order in a sealed proceeding about which neither Ofshe
nor Black knew anything.
32
After approximately twenty months, Black learned of the deal between
Turow and Glass and sought to have the ongoing criminal prosecution
of Ofshe dismissed because of the prosecutorial interference with Ofshe's
right to unconflicted counsel. Black's motion to dismiss the indictment
was denied,33 and Ofshe was convicted and sentenced to four years
25. See infra note 194 (giving hypothetical example of "noble" ratting).
26. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
27. 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1987).
28. Ofshe, 817 F.2d at 1511.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1511 & n.2.
31. See id. at 1511-12.
32. See id.
33. Ofshe, 817 F.2d at 1508.
1993]
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in prison.3 4 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that Ofshe suffered
no prejudice by Glass' actions and that the actions of the government
"were not so outrageous as to 'shock the universal sense of justice. ' -' s
Therefore, the court affirmed the district court decision.36 The Eleventh
Circuit disagreed that any Sixth Amendment violation had been shown,
because no information obtained through the body bug was communicated
to the prosecuting attorney in Florida and Ofshe had been represented
zealously by Black throughout.37 The court further held that the govern-
ment conduct had not been so shocking as to violate the Fifth Amend-
ment's due process protections.3
The Eleventh Circuit, while holding that the Government's conduct
was not necessarily "'shocking to the universal sense of justice,"' 3' 9
made it plain that it did not condone the use of defense attorneys as
informants against their clients. 4° In a now famous footnote, the court
termed Glass' and Turow's conduct "reprehensible" and referred the
matter publicly to the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commis-
sion.4' That Commission then launched an investigation of Turow's
actions, 42 but eventually dismissed the inquiry without establishing
any wrongdoing on Turow's part.43
Turow filed with the court of appeals a motion to strike from the
record the damning footnote." In denying the motion, a three judge
panel of the Eleventh Circuit, far from backing off its earlier footnote,
34. David Berg, Shallow Ruling Trespasses on Client Confidentiality, FULTON COUNTY
DAILY REP., Sept. 2, 1987, at 2.
35. Ofshe, 817 F.2d at 1516.
36. Id. at 1517.
37. Id. at 1515-16.
38. Id. at 1516.
39. Id.
40. Ofshe, 817 F.2d at 1516.
41. Id. at 1516 n.6.
42. Martha Middleton, Troubles for Scott Turow, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 17, 1987, at 2.
43. See Andrew L. Kaufman, Judicial Ethics: The Less Often Asked Questions, 64 WAsH.
L. REV. 851, 866 (1989) (citing letter from Deborah M. Kennedy, Senior Counsel to the
Commission, to Thomas P. Sullivan, attorney for Turow (Dec. 13, 1988)).
44. Court Opinion Memorandum at 1, United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir.
Nov. 16, 1987) (No. 82-6129).
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wrote that Turow may have committed an "obstruction of justice"
and directed its order to the attention of the United States Attorney for
the Southern District of Florida for investigation." The United States
Attorney's Office referred the matter to the Office of Public Integrity
of the Department of Justice,47 which cleared Turow." The Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Commission voted to dismiss its investiga-
tion. 9 While Turow has described the Ofshe experience as the "most
dismal-and disappointing-moment" of his professional career, he
has defended his actions: "I believed-and continue to believe-that
neither clients nor lawyers have the right to plan crimes secure from
government law enforcement efforts."'5
Marvin Glass did not fare as well as Scott Turow. Despite his
cooperation with the United States Attorney's Office, he was convicted
of drug charges related to "Operation Greylord" and was sentenced to
serve eight years in prison.51 In addition, he was disbarred, s2 although
it is not at all apparent that this discipline was the result of his Ofshe
betrayal rather than his conviction for the narcotics offense.
A more egregious example of ratting, probably the most questionable
and extreme, can be found in the case of United States v. Marshank,53
involving Los Angeles attorney Ronald Minkin. Minkin cooperated
extensively with prosecutors and Drug Enforcement Agency officials
to ensure the conviction, or at least the cooperation, of several suspected
45. Court Opinion at 5, Ofshe (No. 82-6129).
46. Id. at 13.
47. See George Volsky, Lawyer-Novelist is Assailed for Handling of Drug Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 1987, at A16.
48. Justice Department Clears Ex-Prosecutor, a Novelist, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1988, at
38. In a letter to Turow's attorney, the Justice Department wrote that "'there is no evidence
that any of the actions taken by Mr. Turow or his superiors violated any Federal criminal statute."'
Id.
49. Kaufman, supra note 43, at 866.
50. Scott Turow, Law School v. Reality, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1988, (Magazine) at 52,
74.
51. William B. Crawford, Jr., Attorney Panel Probes Lawyer, Author Turow, CH. TRiB.,
Aug. 5, 1987, Chicagoland Section, at 3.
52. Middleton, supra note 42, at 2.
53. 777 F. Supp. 1507 (ND. Cal. 1991).
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drug dealers, most of whom were present or former Minkin clients.54
Minkin began by giving to the investigating officials a list of names
of those who were involved in the drug trade, several of whom were
his clients.-" Subsequently, Minkin worked actively to bring in Seth
Booky, who agreed to cooperate, and the so-called "big fish," Stephen
Marshank, who did not cooperate 6 and whose indictment was the subject
of this reported decision. 7 While Minkin, unlike all of the other lawyers
in the ratting sagas, was not under any suspicion for criminal wrongdoing
himself, he did enter into an arrangement with the government agents
which allowed him to earn millions of dollars in bounties as his share
of confiscated or forfeited property.~
s
Not only did Minkin provide information to officials about Booky
and Marshank, but he actually represented each in their negotiations
with the prosecutors without disclosing his role in the investigation to
his clients.59 Because of the extraordinary steps which Minkin took
to betray his clients, this case stands as the only reported instance where
the lawyer's informing caused the indictment to be dismissed. In a
rather blistering opinion, district court Judge Marilyn Hall Patel found
that the government's conduct created a conflict of interest between
Minkin and Marshank that rendered Minkin's representation of Marshank
ineffectual. 60 The court found that conflict clearly prejudicial and
declared that the Government's conduct in this case was "fundamentally
unfair" and "shocking to the 'universal sense of justice. ' 61 The court
also agreed with Marshank that the Government had failed to fulfill
its "affirmative obligation not to subvert the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel,"6' 2 and it relied upon its supervisory power to dismiss the
indictment.6 Since Judge Patel's opinion, efforts to challenge Minkin's
54. See Marshank, 777 F. Supp. at 1511-18.
55. id. at 1512.
56. Id. at 1512-17.
57. Id. at 1507.
58. Id. at 1514.
59. See Marshank, 777 F. Supp. at 1513-14, 1516.
60. Id. at 1519-20.
61. Id. at 1524.
62. Id. at 1525.
63. Id. at 1530 & n.17.
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conduct in the professional arena have commenced, but as of this writing,
the matter remains unresolved.64
The next story of elaborate lawyer ratting, United States v. White,65
concerns not drug activity but bankruptcy fraud instead. It revolves
around a prosecution of a husband and wife, the Whites, who had filed
for personal bankruptcy using the services of attorney Mark Center.66
The Whites and Center apparently misrepresented certain asset holdings
in the bankruptcy papers. 67 Later, after that representation was complet-
ed, Center was convicted for bankruptcy fraud in an unrelated matter. 6
While awaiting sentencing on that charge, Center offered to provide
information about the Whites' bankruptcy to prosecutors. 69  He then
64. Marshank's successor attorney referred the case to the Justice Department for investigation,
while the California State Bar reportedly has begun an investigation as well. Howard Mintz,
Counsel's Deal with Feds Gets Drug Case Tossed, THE RECORDER, Nov. 6, 1991, at 1. The
Justice Department investigation is proceeding. See Howard Mintz, PatelAsked to Reconsider
Dismissal of Drug Case, THE RECORDER, Dec. 17, 1991, at 2. In September, 1991, Marshank
filed suit against Minkin for malpractice. Marshank v. Minkin, Cal. Sup. CL Civil No. BC
037605 (Sept. 16, 1991); see also Howard Mintz, Accused Hashish Smuggler Sues Former
Counsel, TBE RECORDER, Sept. 17, 1991, at 8.
The press has also reported efforts on the part of the prosecutors in the Marshank case
to pursue the prosecution notwithstanding the dismissal ruling. The federal prosecutors have
requested permission from the District Court judge to cross-examine Marshank about his attorney-
client relationship with Minkin, claiming that they were not allowed to question Marshank
about his relationship with Minkin at the hearings held prior to the dismissal of the indictment.
See Howard Mintz, Patel Asked to Reconsider Dismissal of Drug Case, THE RECORDER, Dec.
17, 1991, at 2. The prosecution is also seeking reconsideration of the dismissal of the indictment,
arguing that the court should have imposed a lesser remedy such as suppressing tainted evidence.
See id.
Minkin, meanwhile, has abandoned his legal practice, because of, in his words, the ."obscene'
lack of 'morality' in the Bar." See Howard Mintz, Conflicts Imperil Drug Case, THE RECORDER,
Feb. 11, 1991 at 1, 6. Minkin has boasted that bringing his former clients down brought him
a great deal of satisfaction, and that he believes he was "morally right." See Dan Morain,
A Defector to the War on Drugs, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1991, at Al. The story of this case
has attracted the interest of Hollywood producers and agents. See Dan Morain, Lawyer Ensnared
His Client, Judge Says, L.A. TiMES, Nov. 6, 1991, at BI, B10.
65. 879 F.2d 1509 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990). Except where
otherwise noted, the description of the parties has been elicited from the first cited opinion
listed here.
66. White, 879 F.2d at 1510.
67. Id. at 1510-11.
68. Id. at 1510.
69. Id. The first reported decision indicates that Center "volunteered" information about
fraud in the Whites' bankruptcy. Id. The second opinion states that the FBI had been looking
into the White affair and asked Center about it. White, 950 F.2d at 428.
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gained access to his prior law firm, copied documents relating to the
earlier transaction, and delivered the papers to the United States Attorney's
Office. 70 Neither the trial judge nor the Whites' attorney saw any of
the documents that the Government received from Center, and none
was used in the Whites' trial. 1
The Whites were convicted and appealed, claiming, among other
things, that Center's involvement in the prosecution effort deprived them
of certain rights. 72 Judge Posner, writing for the circuit court, did not
disagree and remanded the matter to the trial court to hold hearings
on the question of whether the Whites' Fifth Amendment due process
rights and attorney-client privilege may have been violated by the
government's use of the information that White had given Center.3
The court held at the same time that the defendants' Sixth Amendment
rights were unaffected because they were represented by new counsel,
and not by Center, in the trial.74
On remand the trial court found that the information that the Whites
had given Center in the documents was not privileged.75 In rejecting
the Whites' appeal of that ruling, the Seventh Circuit noted that the
information which White disclosed to the prosecutors was intended to
be used for a publicly filed document, the bankruptcy petition and
schedule, and thus was not intended to be confidential and hence was
not privileged.76 The court did not address the seeming inapplicability
of the attorney-client privilege and its exception to a case such as this
where Center was not compelled by subpoena or otherwise to provide
information to the prosecution, but did so on his own accord and clearly
for self-interested reasons."
70. White, 879 F.2d at 1510.
71. Id. at 1511.
72. Id. at 1513.
73. Id. at 1513-14.
74. See id. at 1513.
75. White, 950 F.2d at 430.
76. Id.
77. It is elementary that the attorney-client privilege and its exceptions apply only as an
evidentiary rule, which means that it can only arise where information is sought from the lawyer
within an evidentiary proceeding. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 118 cmt. c (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1989). Center's choice to deliver confidential client
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No evidence exists that Center was ever investigated or disciplined
for the White disclosure. He was, however, sentenced to a prison term
for an unrelated bankruptcy fraud conviction."
In United States v. Fortna" and United States v. Harnagea° two
companion cases, attorney James Smith, learning that he was under
investigation for drug activity, agreed with prosecutors to tape record
conversations with two clients, James Harnage and Linda Whitman,
among others, concerning a suspected drug operation.8' Whitman later
turned informant herself and assisted in the investigation. 2 The two
reported decisions address complaints by Harnage and the other indictees
about the use of a lawyer as an informant.8 In Fortna, the Fifth Circuit
ordered the district court to reopen Harnage's indictment to explore
further whether the use of Smith's evidence against Hamage was in
violation of the attorney-client privilege.84 The results of that remand
are not reported, but Harnage was convicted and apparently did not seek
review of that conviction.8a In the next reported proceedings the district
court denied the motions of the other involved defendants who complained
that their rights were violated by the government's use of Smith as an
informant.8 In denying the motions, the court held that the defendants
could claim no attorney-client relationship with Smith, and furthermore
that anything learned by Smith was outside the scope of the attorney-client
information about a past, completed crime would be suspect on ethical grounds, and a defense
of that behavior based upon the evidentiary privilege would seem irrelevant.
78. See White, 950 F.2d at 428.
79. 796 F.2d 724 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986).
80. 662 F. Supp. 766 (D. Colo. 1987).
81. Fortna, 796 F.2d at 727.
82. Id. at 728.
83. See id. at 729, 732; Harnage, 662 F. Supp. at 771.
84. Fortna, 796 F.2d at 731.
85. This inference is drawn from the indication in the second reported opinion, Harnage,
662 F. Supp. at 768, that Harnage was "serving a 100-year federal sentence... pursuant to
the verdicts in the companion case... [and] filed no motions in [the Harnage] action." Id.
86. Harnage, 662 F. Supp. at 773-74. This opinion confuses the same issue encountered
in the second White opinion, by discussing the exception to the attorney-client privilege in
a context where the ratting lawyer offered information entirely on a voluntary basis, and not
subject to subpoena or compulsion. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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privilege! 7 Smith, incidently, was disbarred for his ratting; the Colorado
Supreme Court held explicitly that ratting violates established ethical
standards.88
In In re United States (Noons),89 attorney C. Marshall Rea was
involved with Thomas and Phillip Noons, two brothers, in setting up
various real estate transactions. which were alleged to be intended to
defraud the FSLIC.9° When Rea found himself under suspicion, he
cooperated with the Government in recording several phone calls with
the Noonses and turned evidence, including the recordings, over to the
prosecutors. 9" The defendants objected to the resulting prosecution;
they claimed that use of their lawyer against them was in violation of
their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.9' The reported opinion concerns
the defendants' attempt to depose Rea exparte; this request was allowed
by the trial court but set aside by the court of appeals. 93 The motion
to dismiss was later disallowed, with the trial judge called Rea's conduct
"sleazy" but "not illegal."'94
The criminal proceedings in United States v. Arteaga9s involved
a defendant whose former lawyer had served as a government informant
in arranging a drug sale.9' On appeal from his conviction, Arteaga
87. See Harnage, 662 F. Supp. at 774.
88. People v. Smith, 778 P.2d 685 (Colo. 1989). The Colorado Supreme Court stressed
that Smith
was a private attorney, not a prosecuting attorney. We do not agree that the above-
described policy considerations [allowing prosecutors to resort to deceit as a legitimate
investigatory tactic] permit private counsel to deal dishonestly and deceitfully with
clients, former clients and others. To hold otherwise would fatally undermine the
foundation of trust and confidentiality that is essential to the attorney-client relationship
in the context of civil as well as criminal proceedings.
Id. at 687.
89. 878 F.2d 153 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991 (1989).
90. In re United States (Noons), 878 F.2d at 155.
91. See id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 155-56, 159.
94. United States v. Noons, Criminal No. H-89-92, at 11 (SD. Tex. Sept. 5, 1991).
95. 807 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1986).
96. Arteaga, 807 F.2d at 425.
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raised the attorney-client privilege objection as well as a due process
* objection that use of a lawyer constituted outrageous prosecutorial
conduct. 7 The appeals court dismissed the due process claim, noting
that the use of close relationships, and the accompanying exploitation
of the trust therein, does not offend the constitution.
One last case contains the second firm indication, other than that
involving James Smith, of a lawyer being sanctioned by a disciplinary
authority for his involvement in ratting. In Committee on Professional
Ethics and Conduct v. Mollman,99 a lawyer agreed to cooperate with
prosecutors in gathering evidence about the drug activities of a friend
and former client of the lawyer in return for immunity from prosecution
for his own drug activities.1 ° He secretly tape recorded conversations
with the friend,01 and that action led to an indefinite suspension of
Mollman's license.0 2
The foregoing list shows that instances of prosecutors using willing
lawyers to implicate their clients are far from rare. Defense attorneys
agree-they contend, as one quote tells us, that "'[it is] happen[ing]
more and more."' 03 A Justice Department official's comments implies
that the defense lawyer's observation may be accurate: "'[U-]sing lawyers
as snitches isn't something we do a lot, but it is something we think
we ought to do .... It is [one of] the tools we have, and it is a perfectly
valid one."''"" Whether it is "valid" is the issue that deserves much
more careful consideration.
97. Id. at 426-27.
98. See id. The defendant withdrew the attorney-client privilege claim at oral argument.
Id.
99. 488 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa 1992). The concurring opinion however, leaned toward allowing
lawyers the option of secretly recording conversations with clients as a means to "foster a search
for truth and honest dealing." Mollman, 488 N.W.2d at 174.
100. Mollman, 488 N.W.2d at 169.
101. Id. at 169-70.
102. Id. at 173.
103. Robert Kuntz, When Lawyers Wear Wires, Where Can Clients Turn?, CoNN. L. TRIB.,
Aug. 12, 1991, at 10.
104. Id.
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I. The Law
A. Preamble
If ratting were unlawful, that is, if in cases where ratting contributed
to the evidence against a defendant the indictment would be dismissed
or the evidence would be excluded, then the ethics question would be
of relatively minor import, because there would be no incentive to rat
or for prosecutors to induce lawyers to rat. Unfortunately, at least for
those of us who find the practice ethically troublesome, despite elaborate
arguments against the use of surreptitiously obtained lawyer evidence
from clients, the practice has been permitted by every court which has
faced the issue, except the Marshank court." s The conclusion after
exploring the judicial decisions is plain: ratting, at least ratting done
well, leads to evidence which aids in convictions. Judges seem to regret
that they cannot penalize the prosecution for this conduct, but notwith-
standing that regret they uphold convictions.'"
My purpose here is not to critique or explore in detail the Fifth and
Sixth Amendment implications of ratting, because my intention is to
try to address the ethics, and not necessarily the law, surrounding ratting.
I believe, though, that a brief description of those elements would make
the present endeavor more coherent. With that in mind, I develop in
this Part the doctrinal arguments and why they have failed in the reported
cases.
B. The Attorney-Client Privilege Question
The initial concern of a defendant in a criminal proceeding whose
lawyer has served as the source of incriminating information will often
be the attorney-client privilege. Clients are led to believe that conversa-
tions with lawyers are confidential0 7 and are apt to claim attorney-client
105. United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507 (N.D. Cal. 1991); see also supra notes
53-63 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Lee A. Pizzimenti, The Lawyer's Duty to Warn Client About Limits on
Confidentiality, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 441 (1990) (discussing lawyers who fail to educate clients
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privilege when the information entrusted to a lawyer is used in a criminal
proceeding.1 In ratting cases, however, the privilege will most often
be inapplicable, because of the "crime/fraud" exception to the privilege.
1. Fifth Amendment Concerns
It is important to note, preliminarily, that the attorney-client privilege
objection would be available only in those cases where the lawyer's
testimony is to be used in trial, or is otherwise compelled. Unlike the
ethical obligation to maintain the confidences of one's client, the attorney-
client privilege is an evidentiary rule applied to judicial processes which
seek to compel evidence from a lawyer about communications with
the client.1°9 A lawyer who opts to talk to prosecutors sua sponte
does not implicate the attorney-client privilege, although the prosecutor's
later use of evidence obtained through the leads provided by the lawyer
may well be problematic. As the White court noted, the difficulty is
founded on Fifth Amendment due process grounds and not on attorney-
client privilege grounds.1
Rule 502(d)(1) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence describes the crime/
fraud exception as follows: "There is no privilege under this rule...
[i]f the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid
anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably
about the exceptions to the ordinary confidentiality principles); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking
Confidentiality, 74 IowA L. REv. 351, 382-83 (1989) (providing survey results which show
clients at times expect greater confidentiality than they are entitled to).
108. See, e.g., United States v. White, 879 F.2d 1509, 1513 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1027 (1990) (raising the attorney-client privilege in challenging a conviction); United
States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir.) (raising the privilege in challenging a conviction),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1987).
109. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: THE LAW GovERNING LAWYERS § 118 cmt. c (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1989); see also David J. Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Exception to
the Attorney-Client Privilege for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. REv. 443 (1986).
110. White, 879 F.2d at 1513. Judge Posner addresses the Whites' complaint that their
lawyer's submissions might have led to admissible evidence by reference to "serious governmental
misconduct that would violate a criminal defendant's rights under the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment." Id.; see United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507, 1519 n.11
(N.D. Cal. 1991) (discussing the "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine" as applied to the use
of tainted lawyer information) (citing United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099, 1113
(11th Cir. 1990)); see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed.
1149 (1967).
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should have known to be a crime or fraud.""1 In all of the ratting
cases reported thus far, the communications that the lawyer collected
and used against his client concerned criminal activity that was planned
or ongoing (at the time of the lawyer/client communication, but not
necessarily at the time of the lawyer disclosure), and that was separate
from any criminal charges that might have been the subject of the
lawyer's representation of the client." The courts addressing objections
by clients about lawyer ratting inevitably call upon the attorney-client
privilege exception as an initial justification for their refusal to dismiss
indictments. 4 Since the exception to the privilege will inevitably
be applicable, claims under the privilege offer little hope in a defendant's
challenge to a ratting-influenced prosecution."
2. Sixth Amendment Concerns
The Sixth Amendment 16 has potential applicability to ratting cases
in three ways, but the three will seldom apply to ratting done "well."
The three Sixth Amendment concerns are ineffective assistance of counsel,
111. UNIF. R. EvID. 502(d)(1). See, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 109 S. CL
2619, 105 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1989); see also Note, The Future Crime or Tort Exception to
Communications Privileges, 77 HARV. L. REv. 730 (1964).
112. See, e.g., United States v. White, 879 F.2d 1509, 1510 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1027 (1990), and appeal after remand, 950 F.2d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 1991) (attorney
providing to prosecutors information about completed bankruptcy fraud learned prior to its
completion).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
963 (1987).
114. See, e.g., In re United States (Noons), 878 F.2d 153, 157 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 991 (1989); United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724, 730 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
950 (1986); United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508, 1515 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
963 (1987); United States v. Harnage, 662 F. Supp. 766, 774 (D. Colo. 1987); see also United
States v. White, 879 F.2d 1509, 1513 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that the government failed to
raise the fraud exception), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990).
115. It deserves repeating, though, that the ratting cases have seldom involved actual testimony
by lawyers against clients, and thus are distinguishable from the subpoena cases in which lawyers
are subjected involuntarily to examination about their clients' affairs. See infra text accompanying
notes 137-41. To the extent that the lawyers in the ratting cases have, by their voluntary assistance
to the prosecution, violated any ethical obligations outside of the attorney-client privilege, due
process considerations might affect the validity of any conviction that follows.
116. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall... have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Id.
"RATING"
government intrusion into the attorney-client relationship, and conflict
of interest.1 17 These arguments only come into play, however, where
the government has interfered with the lawyer who is defending the
accused on the charge which is the subject of the Sixth Amendment
claim.1 If ratting takes its usual route, where a lawyer collects evi-
dence from a client and that evidence leads to a later prosecution, the
Sixth Amendment seems to have little import. It is instructive to note
that United States v. Ofsheu9 presented the most direct Sixth Amend-
ment implications, and yet in Ofshe the conviction was upheld. A brief
inquiry into the court's reasoning there will show the possible uses of
Sixth Amendment theory in cases of lawyer ratting.
To claim ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demon-
strate that his lawyer has failed to "render 'adequate legal assistance"'
in his defense.' 2° Since the 1984 opinion of the United States Supreme
Court in Strickland v. Washington,' however, a defendant must show
both ineffective representation and actual prejudice as a result of that
ineffectiveness. 2 2  The mere fact that a lawyer might be collecting
evidence against his client on unrelated matters while defending that
client in a criminal proceeding does not, by itself, demonstrate ineffective
representation and prejudice. The Ofshe case, where Glass defended
Ofshe while tape recording their conversations to provide to prosecutors
pursuant to a different investigation, did not result in a dismissal."3
117. See Peterson, supra note 5, at 621-34.
118. See, e.g., United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
963 (1987).
119. 817 F.2d 1508 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1987).
120. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d
674, 692 (1984) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1716, 64
L. Ed. 2d 333, 334 (1980)).
121. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
122. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. For an analysis of Strickland and its impact on claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel, see Vivian 0. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense
Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths-A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L REV. 9 (1986) (analyzing Sticklod
and its impact on claims of ineffective assistance); Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread
the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims, 77 GEO. LJ. 413 (1988) (noting how a few claims of ineffective assistance have survived
the Strickland standard).
123. Ofshe, 817 F.2d at 1508-09, 1516 (failing to discuss Strickland, while recognizing
that Ofshe was "zealous[ly] represent[ed]" by an attorney in addition to Glass); see also Peterson,
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Richard Uviller in his review of Ofshe argues that as long as there is
no apparent softpedalling of the ongoing representation, the fact that
the defense counsel may be collecting evidence should not cause any
concern for the defendant.124
The second Sixth Amendment concern is that of government interfer-
ence in the attorney-client relationship during a criminal proceeding.
The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Morrisonu s
established a standard which permits government intrusion in the attorney-
client relationship to rise to the level of a constitutional issue, but only
in rather stringent instances. A complaining defendant, said the Court,
must demonstrate prejudice resulting in an "adverse... impact on the
criminal proceeding."' 26  Like the Strickland test, this standard is
unlikely to be met merely by a showing that one's lawyer provided the
information that may have added to an investigation subsequently leading
to an indictment or arrest.
12 7
The third Sixth Amendment concern is one which by its literal
language offers more hope for those who challenge convictions, but
which at the same time has not been well received by judicial decision
makers so far. That concern is about the ratting lawyer's conflict of
interest. Under ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine, it is easier
to prove harm when a lawyer is operating under a conflict of interest
than when he is not. In Cuyler v. Sullivan,'28 the Supreme Court held
that "a defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected
the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in
order to obtain relief.1 29  The Court's later opinion in Strickland
supra note 5, at 624-25 (discussing the curious absence of a Strickland discussion in the Ofshe
opinion).
124. See Uviller, supra note 4, at 1892-94.
125. 449 U.S. 361, 101 S. CL 665, 66 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1981).
126. Morrison, 449 U.S. at 365.
127. See Peterson, supra note 5, at 625-26; see also United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508,
1515 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1987). For cases finding that the interference
implicated Sixth Amendment rights, see United States v. Valencia, 541 F.2d 618 (6th Cir. 1976)
(using law firm secretary as informant); United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507 (N.D.
Cal. 1991) (finding a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights where the government
intruded inappropriately on the attorney-client relationship).
128. 446 U.S. 335, 100 S. Ct 1708, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980).
129. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50.
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confirmed, and made more explicit, that a less exacting test applies when
a lawyer accused of ineffective assistance can be shown to have a conflict
of interest; in those cases the presumption is that prejudice results.L30
Consequently, one might think that lawyers who rat on clients while
they are representing those clients might create for defendants an opening
to attack a conviction in the first prosecution using the Cuyler stan-
dard.Ul Since these scenarios are rare, one can only speculate about
the success of this argument. It did not succeed in Ofshe," but in
that case the defense counsel team included one non-tainted lawyer.
Richard Uviller argues that the Glass arrangement does not constitute
a disqualifying conflict of interest, but his reasoning is not terriblypersuasive."3
3. Fifth Amendment Objections
Unlike Sixth Amendment objections, which seem most appropriately
raised in the rare instance where the ratting lawyer remains as counsel
130. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2067, 80 L. Ed. 2d
674, 696 (1984).
131. See Peterson, supra note 5, at 628-34.
132. United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1987).
133. See Uviller, supra note 4, at 1889-92. Uviller addresses the conflict of interest of
the concurrently informing and representing lawyer only obliquely, in arguing that such lawyer
should not be disqualified from the representation. Id. at 1889-90. He addresses the conflict
of interest of a suspected (but not yet informing) lawyer more directly, arguing that the mere
temptation to sell out one's client for personal advantage is overly speculative as a source of
professional sanction. Id. at 1891-92. His argument on the latter point is intriguing, but one
wonders whether the disclosure and consent element of Model Rule 1.7(b) ought not to be
triggered by the lawyer's potential to want to curry favor with a prosecutor. See MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1992). For the lawyer who has actually made the
deal to turn in a client for personal gain, it is hard to see why such an arrangement would not
at a minimum require that the client be informed about the dual allegiance and "whether it
will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering
alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the
client." Id. cmt. para. 4; see also Kevin McMunigal, Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest
Doctrine, 5 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 823, 871-75 (1992). The Marshank court held that such
a dual role must be disclosed to a defendant and a "knowing and intelligent waiver" obtained.
United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507, 1528 (ND. Cal. 1991). On the other hand,
defendants who complain of a conflict of interest in appointed counsel who themselves are
under suspicion by prosecutors for unrelated criminal activity have found that courts reject
that claim. See, e.g., United States v. Aiello, 900 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1990); Commonwealth
v. McCloy, 393 Pa. 217, 574 A.2d 86 (1990), appeal denied, 588 A.2d 508 (1991).
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for the defense in the case for which the information was provided,"m
the Fifth Amendment seems to offer grounds for a defendant to object
regardless of the timing of the ratting. Still, in reported cases this
objection has consistently failed.
The Fifth Amendment grounds are twofold. The first is one based
upon the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination.'"
The second is one rooted in that amendment's Due Process clause."'
The self-incrimination argument has seductive initial appeal but in fact
is seldom a cognizable claim. The argument would proceed as follows:
The Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from forcing a defendant
to incriminate himself. Information obtained from a lawyer who, at
least implicitly, promises confidentiality serves as a convenient end run
around the protection of the Fifth Amendment. By using the lawyer
as spokesperson or alter ego for the defendant, the prosecution is obtaining
by subterfuge what it could not obtain by direct questions to the defen-
dant.
The above argument has been made repeatedly in other cases where
lawyers must testify against their clients, notably where lawyers are
subpoenaed to testify before grand juries.137  The defense lawyers'
arguments inevitably lose, especially when grounded on self-incrimination
grounds. They lose because the United States Supreme Court has
established that the self-incrimination protection when lawyers are
involved cannot exceed the protections available under the attorney-client
privilege. 1" In other words, if what the lawyer is asked to testify
about is protected by the attorney-client privilege, then a defendant may
134. See, e.g., United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 963 (1987); see also Uviller, supra note 4, at 1889-90.
135. U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself..I. d.
136. Id. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law .... Id.
137. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Matter No. 91-01386, 969 F.2d 995 (1 1th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Perry, 857 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Attorney (Under
Seal), 679 F. Supp. 1403 (N.D. W. Va. 1988). For a discussion of the relationship between
the privilege and lawyer subpoenas, see Max D. Stern & David A. Hoffman, Privileged Informers:
The Attorney Subpoena Problem and a Proposalfor Reform, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1783,1796-1801
(1988); Ellen Y. Suni, Subpoenas to Criminal Defense Lawyers: A Proposal for Limits, 65
OR. L. REV. 215 (1986).
138. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410-12, 96 S. Ct. 1569, 1581-83, 48 L.
Ed. 2d 39, 56-58 (1976).
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raise Fifth Amendment self-incrimination grounds to prevent the lawyer
from testifying."' In ratting cases, then, the self-incrimination argument
offers nothing greater than the attorney-client privilege argument discussed
above,4 ' which means that if the ratting concerns criminal activity
it offers no protection whatsoever.1
41
The due process argument under the Fifth Amendment is a very
different argument Stated simply, it claims that "[a] court may...
dismiss an indictment when 'the conduct of law enforcement agents
is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the
government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction." 42
To satisfy the "outrageous" standard, the Supreme Court in United States
v. Russell1 43 stated that the government conduct at issue must be funda-
mentally unfair and "'shocking to the universal sense of justice."' "44
Defendants whose lawyers have ratted against them inevitably rely upon
this language and this standard to claim that the resulting indictment
should be dismissed. With the exception of the Marshank case,' 4
s
courts have shown a notable reluctance to hold that ratting is "shocking
to the universal sense of justice.'
Courts addressing the due process argument have tended to collapse
the prejudice argument needed for ineffective assistance of counsel claims
with the "outrageous" standard and hold that absent discrete harm to
a defendant, it is difficult to find conduct "shocking to the universal
139. See id. The Fisher doctrine was first applied to lawyer subpoenas in United States
v. Hedge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977). For a discussion of Fisher and the Fifth
Amendment implications of lawyer testimony against clients, see Subin, supra note 2, at 1120-27;
Kevin R. Reitz, Clients, Lawyers and the Fifth Amendment: The Need for a Protected Privilege,
41 DUKE L.L 572, 639-48 (1991).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 109-15.
141. See, e.g., United States v. White, 879 F.2d 1509, 1513 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1027 (1990); United States v. Harnage, 662 F. Supp. 766, 774 (D. Colo. 1987).
142. United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507, 1523 (ND. Cal. 1991) (quoting United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32, 93 S. Ct. 1637, 1643, 36 L. Ed. 2d 366, 373 (1973)).
143. 411 U.S. 423, 431-32, 93 S. Ct. 1637, 1643, 36 L. Ed. 2d 366, 373 (1973).
144. Russell, 411 U.S. at 432 (quoting Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234, 246, 80
S. Ct. 297, 304, 4 L. Ed. 2d 268, 276 (1960)).
145. See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., United States v. White, 950 F.2d 426, 431 (7th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508, 1515-16 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1987); United States
v. Arteaga, 807 F.2d 424, 426 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Harnage, 662 F. Supp. 766,
773-74 (D. Colo. 1987).
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sense of justice.1 147 A good example of this can be found in the opin-
ions resulting from the Ofshe prosecution. In its reported decision, the
Eleventh Circuit labelled Glass' and Turow's conduct as "reprehensi-
ble"1 ' but not a violation of due process.1 49 The court further defend-
ed its characterization of the attorneys' behavior in the unpublished
opinion issued in response to Scott Turow's motion to delete the "repre-
hensible" language from the first, published opinion.' s' Thus, it will
take more than merely "reprehensible" conduct on the part of the
Government to constitute a due process violation, especially if the
defendant has suffered no apparent prejudice by the questionable conduct.
IV. The Ethics
A. Introduction to the Ethics Consideration
The purpose of the previous Part has not been to engage in a developed
critique of the legal issues which have been raised against lawyer ratting.
147. See, e.g., United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
963 (1987); United States v. Hamage, 662 F. Supp. 766 (D. Colo. 1987). For a review of
the caselaw on the "outrageous conduct" defense and its relative lack of success, see the opinions
in United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Ahluwalia, 807
F. Supp. 1490 (ND. Cal. 1992). The only cases in which that defense has prevailed, aside
from the Marshank case, were the following entrapment cases: United States v. Batres-Santolino,
521 F. Supp. 744 (1981); United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978); United States
v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Greene, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971).
148. United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508, 1516 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963
(1987).
149. Ofshe, 817 F.2d at 1508, 1516.
150. See Court Opinion Memorandum at 1, United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508 (11th
Cir. Nov. 16, 1987) (No. 82-6129). In denying Turow's motion, the Circuit Court offered
two quotes evidencing their, and others', distaste for what Turow and Glass had accomplished
in the Ofshe prosecution. The panel first quoted from the United States Magistrate who heard
earlier proceedings in the case:
mhe right hand of the Government (the Illinois branch) was very busy trying to conduct
undercover business in South Florida without letting the left hand of the Government
(the South Florida branch) know what it was doing. When the right hand finally had
to confront the left hand, they apparently decided to wash both hands and wipe the
resulting grime on a towel to be put into a sealed hamper that neither the defendant
nor the prosecutor nor even the defendant's local counsel could see into.
Id. at 3 n.2. It then offered a quote from the Government's own lawyer at oral argument:
"'[W]e agree-we have no problem with the magistrate's ruling on this in which she said it
was horrible and nasty and all that. I can assure you we will try not to have it happen again."'
Id.
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Rather, my purpose has been to show that several arguments exist to
challenge the use of a defendant's lawyer's testimony or evidence against
him in a criminal proceeding, but that the consensus of judicial opinion
thus far has been that prosecutions will proceed and convictions will
stand. I am not prepared to say that this trend is correct or justifiable,
but only that it is documented and not irrational given applicable Supreme
Court precedent."
The success of prosecutors who have exploited lawyer ratting means
that an exploration of the ethics of this activity carries greater urgency
and weight. Lawyers may be prohibited by ethical doctrine from engaging
in activity which may be permissible, but not mandatory, s2 under
substantive law.' s3 What follows is an assessment of why ethicists
ought to be firmn in their message about the evils of such lawyer activity,
and why there should be a resulting bar prohibition of the conduct.
One important introductory caveat deserves note. A review of reported
cases involving lawyer ratting shows that the lawyers who engage in
such conduct inevitably do so when they are seeking some leniency
from a prosecutor because of their own risk of prosecution or indict-
ment. s4 These lawyers are most likely at imminent risk of suspension
or disbarment as a result of the conduct which has led to the prosecutor's
interest in them. Lawyers in that position are hardly prime candidates
151. See supra Part I1I.B.
152. Apparently, court orders will override seemingly contrary ethical mandates, if only
because of the power of contempt through which courts enforce their rulings. See, e.g., In
re Backiel, 906 F.2d 78, 87-88 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 980 (1990) (holding attorney
in contempt for refusing to give evidence against her client); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 115 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1989). No example can be found of
a lawyer sanctioned by her professional licensing authority for obeying a procedurally valid
court order. But see ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY
233-34 (3d ed. 1989) (implying that an obligation to commit contempt might exist) (citing
People v. Kor, 129 Cal. App. 2d 436, 277 P.2d 94, 101 (1954)).
153. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389,
1412-27 (1992) (noting that substantive law "trumps" ethics at times and at other times ethics
will prevail). But see Ellen S. Podgor, Form 8300: The Demise of Law as a Profession, 5 GEO.
J. ,EGAL Emcs 485, 528 (1992) (criticizing the use of court orders to regulate attorney behavior).
154. See, e.g., United States v. White, 879 F.2d 1509, 1510 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1027 (1990); In re United States (Noons), 878 F.2d 153 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 991 (1989); United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
963 (1987); United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986);
United States v. Harnage, 662 F. Supp. 766 (D. Colo. 1987); Committee on Professional Ethics
.v. Mollman, 488 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa 1992).
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for exhortation by ethics principles; thus, a firm statement by the
organized bar on this subject may not serve to deter very much lawyer
betrayal. On the other hand, prosecutors would certainly be constrained
in their use of information gained from or by a ratting lawyer if the
bar were to make clear that such use contravenes established ethical
principles. L"
Notwithstanding the problem of the incorrigible betraying lawyer,
a firm condemnation of ratting still seems of great significance. As
developed below, it seems critical that clients understand that betrayal
is never a matter of accepted professional conduct. Clients, of course,
can never be assured that their lawyers will not violate sacred duties,
just as clients can never be guaranteed that lawyers will not steal their
money, expropriate their business opportunities, or reveal their secret
strategies to the clients' opponents. The important message is that lawyers
who act in such a manner have no sanction in doing so by the bar and
by its stated principles. Because one may read certain judicial opinions
and scholarship as less than condemning of lawyer betrayal, a coherent
message of disapproval is necessary.
B. The Defender's Arguments
Ratting does not contravene the traditional notions of professional
ethics, some might argue. I want to explore that position here, using
authority from positivist professional regulatory standards, as well as
more sophisticated ethical discourse surrounding the moral role responsi-
bilities of lawyers.
Within the positivist realm, it is quickly apparent that the Model Code
offers greater support to the defense of ratting than the Model Rules,
at least in the area of protecting confidences. The fact that information
may be unprotected by the attorney-client privilege does not leave that
155. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 (1992) (limiting
prosecutorial subpoenas of lawyers); United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649, 650 (1st Cir.),
affd on reh'g, 832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987) (affirming validity of Massachusetts' Prosecutorial
Function Rule 15, which makes it "unprofessional conduct" for prosecutors to subpoena attorneys
to provide evidence about clients except in narrow circumstances); Peter C. Sheridan, Grand
Jury Subpoenas to Criminal Defense Attorneys: Massachusetts Restrains the Federal Prosecutor
Through an "Ethical" Rule, 2 GEO. . LEGAL EImcs 485 (1988).
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same information unprotected within the ethical obligation of confidentiali-
ty. U6 The attorney-client privilege's exceptions merely require a lawyer
to speak when asked to in a formal proceeding; they do not authorize
spontaneous speech by a lawyer of that information which could be
revealed upon questioning.5 7  Notwithstanding that broad protection
of client information, the Model Code contains a common and well-known
exception covering "[t]he intention of the client to commit a crime and
the information necessary to prevent the crime."'' s Therefore, under
the literal language of the Model Code, ratting is perfectly permissible,
to the extent that it is a revelation by an attorney of the client's intention
to commit a crime. In addition, under some versions of the Model Code
a lawyer may possess the obligation to reveal the client's completed
frauds (some of which may qualify as crimes), 9 although that obliga-
tion has been removed under the ABA's amended version of the Code
156. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLIY DR 4-101(A) (1980) (distinguishing
between "confidence," which is governed by the evidentiary attorney-client privilege, and "secret,"
which is a much broader term including "other information gained in the professional relationship
that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing
or would be likely to be detrimental to the client"); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr
Rule 1.6(a) (1992) (prohibiting revelation of any "information relating to the representation
of a client"), and cmt. para. 5 (pointing out the broader effect of the ethical mandate as compared
to the attorney-client privilege). See also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 112 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1989); CHARL.ES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETmcs
296 (Practitioner's ed. 1986).
157. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 112 cmt.
c (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1989); Subin, supra note 2, at 1144-45. For a discussion of the interaction
between the attorney-client privilege and out-of-court disclosures, see Robert P. Mostellar,
Child Abuse Reporting Laws and Attorney-Client Confidences: The Reality and Specter of Lawyer
as Informant, 42 DuKE LJ. 203, 224-37 (1992).
158. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1980) (footnotes
omitted).
159. See MODEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1970). The
pre-1974 amendment text read:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon
a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and
if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected
person or tribunal.
See id. This provision was amended in 1974 and now contains an "except" clause; however,
the pre-amendment version remains in effect in some jurisdictions.
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and its interpretation thereof.1' There is also a strong argument in
favor of the orchestration of that revelation, which is the essence of
ratting as I view it, but that issue needs to await a short discussion of
the Model Rules' applicability to the revelation itself.
The defense of ratting under the Model Rules is more difficult. The
plain language of Model Rule 1.6 does not permit ratting, at least at
first blush, because the "intention to commit a crime" exception of the
Code has been limited substantially in the Model Rules to revelation
necessary "to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that
the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm.4 61 Since most of the orchestrated ratting which appears
in the literature does not involve imminent danger, it is more difficult
to use the "intended crime" exception to the Model Rules as an ethical
justification for the activity.
But the Model Rules do not abandon us in the search for a justified
defense of ratting. Rule 1.6 orders the lawyer to protect "information
relating to [the] representation of a client.'' 162 In most of the ratting
examples which have surfaced in published reports, the lawyer is not
collecting information which forms the basis of the actual representation
in progress; it is instead information about other crimes which the lawyer
elicits in his endeavor to assist a prosecutor.1 63 Those other crimes
almost by definition are not "related to the representation," not only
160. See MODEL CODE OF PRO-ESSIONAL REsPoNSIBKITrY DR 7-102(BX1) (1980) (post-1974
amendment, which added the clause, "except when the information is protected as a privileged
communication"); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341
(1975) (interpreting "privileged communication" to include all secrets and not merely information
protected by the attorney-client privilege); Subin, supra note 2, at 1149. Under the Model
Code there also exists discretion to reveal completed or intended criminal or fraudulent activity
of a client if doing so is necessary to defend the lawyer "against an accusation of wrongful
conduct." See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(4) (1980);
Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190, 1194-96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 998 (1974); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 110
F.R.D. 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Henry D. Levine, Self-Interest or Self-Defense: Lawyer Disregard
of the Attorney-Client Privilege for Profit and Protection, 5 HoFSTRA L. REv. 783 (1977).
One might seek to justify ratting as warranted under DR 4-101(c)(4) if the circumstances fit.
161. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1992).
162. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rule 1.6(a) (1992) (emphasis added).
163. See, e.g., In re United States (Noons), 878 F.2d 153 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
991 (1989); United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508, (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963
(1987).
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because of the separate character but also because, arguably, the planning
of criminal activity cannot be representation.'" In this way, the argu-
ment persists, the attorney-client privilege theory and doctrine dovetail
somewhat with the ethical doctrine: In each case the criminal activity
removes the conversations from the ambit of protected lawyering activity,
and as a result no duty exists on the part of a lawyer to protect that
data.'1S
The defense of ratting under conventional ethical authority cannot
end with a demonstration that both the Model Code and Model Rules
do or may permit the revelation by the lawyer of the information learned
from his client. Ratting is, by the definition I have suggested, conceptual-
ly different from whistleblowing, which also involves the kind of
evaluation just described. The difference is in the orchestration of the
revelation. Ratting requires explicit cooperation with a prosecutor to
collect and preserve evidence while the relationship with the client persists
or continues. Whistleblowing implies a simultaneous disclosure and
severing of the relationship. 1'
164. The critical consideration in deciding whether intended criminal activity is within the
universe of information protected by Model Rule 1.6 appears to be the reason the client has
approached the lawyer. If the relationship has legitimate underpinnings but includes conversation
about future criminal acts, it seems indisputable that the intent of Model Rule 1.6 is to render
the information confidential. To think otherwise would be to vitiate the exception for more
serious crimes: If all intended criminal activity is unprotected, the exception is unnecessary
and the great debate about the exception would be moot. On the other hand, there is some
logic to the proposition that some criminal information should fall outside the ambit of protected
communications even before one reaches the exception for serious crimes. See 1 GEOFFREY
C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAwYm1NG: A HANDBOOK ON THE
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1.6:300-03 (2d ed. Supp. 1991). It is apparent
that only if the client seeks out the lawyer for entirely criminal purposes, and thus is not seeking
"representation," could the information remain unprotected under this reasoning. But see Subin,
supra note 2, at 1152 (rejecting this reasoning).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 107-15.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16. The elements of disclosure and severance
of the attorney-client relationship are used in defming whistleblowing because these elements
inhere in the conventional notion of this action. Discussion of that phenomenon in the professional
literature does not necessarily assume my distinction, and can contemplate secret whistleblowing.
See, e.g., SISsELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE EmIcs OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 210-29
(Vintage Books ed. 1989) (1983) (see Chapter XIV, entitled "Whistleblowing and Leaks").
Bok prefers open revelation and argues its moral superiority, but sympathizes with low level
employees in organizations who might prefer anonymity in order to salvage a position within
the organization about which secrets are revealed. Id. at 223-24. This Article proposes a different
standard for lawyers, but does not pretend to assert that the reasons underlying openness within
the attorney-client relationship would apply to any employee-employer interaction.
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How would a defender of ratting justify the orchestrative elements
of this activity? Using Uviller as an example, 7 the defense proceeds
something like this: Nothing that accompanies ratting (at least ratting
done well) interferes with any element of the attorney-client relationship;
absent some showing that it does, ratting ought not be barred, especially
given its apparent benefits to society. For ratting to be done well, though,
at least three elements must be present. First, the activity about which
information is collected must be distinct from the subject matter of the
representation. This element is self-evidently necessary. A lawyer who
is feeding the prosecution information about the case on which he is
defending his client finds himself in a plain conflict of interests.'68
If the matters are unrelated, however, no conflict exists because there
is no impediment to the lawyer's zealous advocacy on behalf of his
client. Nothing at all prevents the lawyer from simultaneously defending
a client in one proceeding while seeking that client's conviction in
another. To those who see the notion of cognitive dissonance as a
problem for the lawyer, Uviller, at least, argues that such a view misun-
derstands the daily life of an active lawyer accustomed to making
arguments not because he believes in them but because he is asked to
make them. 9
Second, the lawyer must be collecting unprivileged information. °
This point may be both obvious and inevitable given the first assumption,
but it warrants a moment's reflection, if only to point out that the
inevitability of the perspective is not altogether assured. It is not out
167. See Uviller, supra note 4, and accompanying text.
168. See United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507, 1519-20 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
169. See Uviller, supra note 4, at 1890-91. For a contrary argument about the impact of
cognitive dissonance in advocacy posturing, see William H. Simon, The Ideology ofAdvocacy:
Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIs. L. REv. 29, 76-78.
170. It is important to confront whether the term privileged ought to take on only its usual
and literal meaning, which would refer to the evidentiary attorney-client privilege, or whether
it should refer instead to confidential matters, which are far more expansive. Judges have tended
to view the former as dispositive, and to the extent that the lawyer is seeking to offer evidence
in any formal proceeding the real question would be whether the information fits the evidentiary
exception. See supra text accompanying notes 107-15. But the discussion here, and Uviller's
in his article, concerns ethics, and within ethical circles the privilege has little import while
the rules of confidentiality have great significance. It thus appears that any defense of ratting
must assure that the information fits within some exception to the Code's or the Rules' directives
about protecting confidential communication.
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of the question that a lawyer seeking to collect unrelated incriminating
information from his client might find some of that information to be
privileged because the fact that the information does not relate to the
principle representation does not necessarily mean that it is not something
about which the client seeks advice from the lawyer qua lawyer. So
the second assumption is necessary, if perhaps in a fastidious way,
because it is so rare. The discussion above showed how a defender
of ratting will look to exceptions under the Code and the Rules to argue
that any information produced to a prosecutor fits one of those excep-
tions.""
Thi#d, for orchestrated ratting to survive scrutiny, its defenders will
argue, it must be concealed from the client. This element is inherent
in the endeavor, but it helps to see why it is viewed as essential to the
endeavor's ethical defensibility. To review the initial premises for a
moment, it is apparent that the activity's most problematic ethical
concerns relate to the breach of confidentiality and the perception of
a conflict of interest. Confidentiality was dealt with by reference to
the disclosures of crimes exception; the conflict concern is dealt with
by reference to the lawyer's lack of any true competing incentives
combined with the client's "blissful[] ignorance" of any potential lack
of loyalty. 2 The defenders of ratting will concede-and I agree that
this is no great concession--that a client who understands that his lawyer
is collecting evidence against him for the prosecution will perceive a
conflict of loyalties, even, if the argument above is a solid one, and the
lawyer in fact does not believe that he is impaired in his present zealous
representation. In order to avoid the client-induced conflict, the defenders
rely on the inherent expectation within ratting that the lawyer will not
tell the client. As Uviller puts it:
If such a [ratting] lawyer should bring the criminal overture to the
government's attention, are all her professional ties to the client necessari-
ly torn? It would seem that the client, blissfully ignorant of the betrayal,
suffers no loss of confidence, nor should he, regarding those matters
in which he is entitled to the lawyer's full devotion."
171. See supra text accompanying notes 156-65.
172. Uviller, supra note 4, at 1890.
173. Id.
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As long as the lawyer believes himself able to put aside (as lawyers
do every day) his feelings of tension between roles, there is simply no
conflict of interest. As Uviller poses the question, "Where then is the
ethical breach?' '174 Of course, if the lawyer is ratting in order to save
his own skin, as was the case in all but possibly one of the reported
cases,' 75 that fact might alter the ethical landscape. But my task is
to defend (or critique) "pure" ratting, where the lawyer is orchestrating
the collection of incriminating evidence for reasons of altruism and social
conscience. Any critique of this activity must account for that strain
of the activity (putting aside whether that task does not render the
endeavor wholly academic, given the lack of any evidence that such
altruistic behavior ever occurs). This reminder of altruism, though, brings
us to the third element in the defense of ratting-the moral justification
for it.
This part of the defense turns to a more affirmative posture-the
moral worthiness of assisting to prevent criminal activity. It argues
that turning in criminals and preventing crimes is a morally praiseworthy
act, and is better justified than what lawyers are perceived to do more
often, that is, to turn a blind eye to the harm caused by client criminality
(at best) or to assist in that criminality by reliance on the protections
of confidentiality (at worst).
To spell out or understand this argument is not difficult; therefore
I address it only briefly. Sissela Bok, the esteemed philosopher, is but
one example of many who criticize the traditional narrow reading of
lawyers' ethics which privilege confidentiality and loyalty to the client
over concern for the foreseeable harm caused by client activity. As
she writes:
Confronted with such a narrow interpretation of a lawyer's responsibility,
commentators both inside and outside the legal profession might ask:
what about a duty to report criminal plans in cases where the victims
will not otherwise be warned in time? What about criminal conduct
likely to result in deaths that are not "imminent"? What about cases
of ongoing child or spouse abuse, whether or not such conduct risks
174. Id.
175. See supra Part II. Interestingly, the one case in which the attorney was not himself
subject to some criminal suspicion was the one case where the trial court dismissed the indictment
because of the outrageousness of the lawyer's conduct. See United States v. Marshank, 777
F. Supp. 1507, 1530 (ND. Cal. 1991).
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killing victims or subjecting them to "substantial bodily harm"? What
about crimes causing grievous psychological harm? What about financial
fraud that can bankrupt unsuspecting investors? What, finally, about
the vast drug-trading and money-laundering schemes that span the globe
and ultimately cause innumerable deaths?'
The Bok quote is instructive in its capturing of the question that lawyers
need to answer in their defense of the traditional paradigm of zealous
advocacy combined with strict confidentiality, as exemplified by the
Model Rules. Bok begins to outline the possibility of an alternative
paradigm, though, in which lawyers view themselves wedded less to
the agendas of their clients and more to the ordinary social morality
which governs the life of nonprofessionals, which would mean less
confidentiality and more disclosure. Many writers in recent years have
advocated this alternative paradigm. Harry Subin has articulately argued
in favor of this position, 7 as has David Luban' 78 and Fred Zachari-
as,179 among others.'80 Recent developments in lawyer liability,
most notably the Kaye Scholer incident of the Summer of 1992, where
a prominent law firm was induced to a generous settlement of a claim
brought by government officials after the law firm failed to disclose
client wrongdoing,1 81 offer further evidence of the weakening of the
traditional paradigm of confidentiality.
This Article is not the place for a full exposition of the relative merits
of a traditional view versus the developing view of confidentiality.
However, this is the place to note that defenders might understandably
rely upon the moral critics like David Luban and Sissela Bok to argue
176. Sissela Bok, Can Lawyers Be Trusted?, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 913, 915 (1990).
177. Subin, supra note 2.
178. See LUBAN, supra note 15.
179. Zacharias, supra note 107; Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality II: Is
Confidentiality Constitutional?, 75 IOWA L. REv. 601 (1990).
180. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARISAN JUsnCE (1980); Bruce M. Landesman,
Confidentiality and the Lawyer-Client Relationship, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLEs
AND LAWYERS' ET1cs 191 (D. Luban ed. 1984); W. William Hodes, The Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Kutak Rules, and the Trial Lawyer's Code: Surprisingly, Three Peas in a
Pod, 35 U. MIAML. REV. 739 (1981); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice,
37 STAN. L. REv. 589 (1985).
181. See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 50 (discussing Kaye Scholer's settlement with the office
of Thrift Supervision); see also 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WH.LIAM HODEs, THE LAW
OFLAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1.6:201-1
(2d ed. Supp. 1992) (discussing the Kaye Scholer incident); Symposium, supra note 2.
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that an effective and efficient disclosure of criminal plans is not only
defensible, but may even be morally required under circumstances of
great harm to victims of crimes, even if in doing so one were to "betray"
his client s2
C. The Ethical Critique of Ratting
Having sketched out-perhaps unfairly, but not intentionally so--the
best arguments in favor of the ethical propriety of ratting, I now intend
to show that those arguments fail. The arguments fail not because the
moral justification of increased disclosure of wrongdoing is wanting-that
justification is indeed quite defensible-but because the manner of
accomplishing that goal is fundamentally inconsistent with moral
principles which ought to govern the attorney-client relationship. The
primary objections rest on the dishonesty of the activity, and on the
exploitation of trust and intimacy. Much is gained and little is lost if
the planned disclosure occurs with an open conversation with one's
client about the disclosure.
I confront the argument that ratting is ethically defensible, both under
positive law and normatively. I intend to show, in two steps, that under
neither analysis is ratting a valid lawyering activity. First, I argue that
the current Model Code and Model Rules as well as interpretive state-
ments thereon disallow conduct such as ratting, despite some ambigu-
ity.1 3 Second, I offer the substantive normative objections to any
contrary reading of the positive ethical doctrine's ambiguity-the funda-
mental moral objection to individual betrayal after achieving or promising
intimacy,"' and the impact of sanctioned ratting on the development
of systemic trust in lawyers.l s
182. A defender of ratting can find some support for the idea of "betraying" clients. See
LUBAN, supra note 15, at 55-56. Luban employs the term "betray" in discussing his view that
client fidelity may be tnmped by overriding moral considerations. Id. Compare Stephen Ellmann,
Lawyeringfor Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 COLuM. L. REv. 116, 148-50 (1990) (criticizing
Luban's acceptance of betrayal), with David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal, and Autonomy
in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004
(1990) (refining, while continuing to defend, his position on betrayal).
183. See infra text accompanying notes 186-202.
184. See infra text accompanying notes 203-35.
185. See infra text accompanying notes 236-67.
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1. The Model Standards' Incompatibility With Ratting
In the last section I outlined the arguments why a strict reading of
the Model Code and the Model Rules might permit ratting, particularly
when that activity is seen as a noble endeavor, within the "officer of
the court" role, to prevent crime and avoid participation in crime. Here
I wish to show that such a reading is unwarranted.
Initially, some issues deserve to be disposed of in order to reach the
more difficult questions. First, I want to concede the ambiguity within
the language of the standards. The ability to articulate, as I have done,
arguments based upon the Model Code and Model Rules to support
good faith ratting demonstrates this ambiguity. However, I attempt to
show why this ambiguity cannot be resolved in a manner supportive
of ratting.
The second interim item is that any attempt to justify ratting based
upon tape recording"8 of client conversations, even those which purport
to be outside of the attomey-client privilege (which all presumably would,
at least arguably so), almost inevitably must fail given the ethics opinions
of the American Bar Association which decry lawyers' surreptitious
recording of client interactions. 18 7 The model standards unambiguously
discredit all forms of untruthfulness. Within the Model Code, DR 1-
102(A)(4) reads as follows: "A lawyer shall not... [e]ngage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. '' 1  The
parallel language in the Model Rules comes from Rule 8.4: "It is
186. For ratting cases which involve tape recording of client conversations, see In re United
States (Noons), 878 F.2d 153 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991 (1989); United States v.
Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1987); United States v. Fortna,
796 F.2d 724 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986); United States v. Marshank, 777
F. Supp. 1507 (N.D. Cal. 1991); United States v. Harnage, 662 F. Supp. 766 (D. Colo. 1987).
187. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 337 (1974)
(relying on, inter alia, DR 1-102(A)(4), holding that"no lawyer should record any conversation
whether by tapes or other electronic device, without the consent or prior knowledge of all parties
to the conversation"); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op.
1008 (1967) (requiring previous disclosure). See also Committee on Prof. Ethics v. Mollman,
488 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa 1992); People v. Smith, 778 P.2d 685 (Colo. 1989); Mich. Ethics Comm.
Op. 201 (1966); N.Y. State Bar Op. 328 (1974); N.Y.C. Comm., Ops. 290, 848. See generally
Ellen A. Mercer, Note, Undisclosed Recording of Conversations by Private Attorneys, 42 S.C.
L. REV. 995 (1991) (addressing the ethical implications created by attorney's using secret
recordings).
188. MODEL CODE OF PROFSSiONAL REsPONSIBiLrY DR 1-102(A)(4) (1980).
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professional misconduct for a lawyer to... engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."1 9 The ABA having
established that surreptitious recording contravenes this language, it
is plain that ratting involving recording cannot be justified on a positive
law basis. 190 One might want to argue that such a policy is wrong,19'
but those arguments are the normative, and not the positivist, ones to
be addressed below.
The third interim item, which is addressed briefly, is that a lawyer
who is himself under investigation and rats to increase the likelihood
of leniency in his own troubles has, it seems easy to conclude, engaged
in a conflict of interest which is fairly clearly prohibited by the model
standards. This conflict has not necessarily been recognized by courts
reviewing convictions as a constitutional violation equivalent to ineffective
assistance of counsel,' 2 but the ethical transgression of that kind of
ratting behavior appears beyond doubt.1
3
189. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 8.4(c) (1992).
190. A close reading of the ABA opinions does, however, permit a possible argument in
support of ratting. Opinion 337 includes an exception for "extraordinary circumstances in which
the Attorney General of the United States or the principal prosecuting attorney of a state or
local government ... might ethically make and use secret recordings .... " ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 337 (1974). The Opinion does not address
what might justify such extraordinary measures. In ratting cases which have full prosecutorial
approval, a defender may point to this exception to justify using secret recordings as part of
the ratting arrangement. But see People v. Smith, 778 P.2d 685, 687 (Colo. 1989) (finding
that what might be permissible for prosecutors is impermissible for private attorneys).
191. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 5, at 622 (arguing for a flexible understanding of the
concept of "deception," one which would pennit morally justified deception in certain circumstanc-
es). This Comment, while sympathetic to Turow's plight in Ofshe, does not attempt explicitly
to defend a lawyer's deception toward her client, but instead argues that occasional deception
of third parties or of a tribunal may be justified and necessary as a method of achieving justice.
Id. at 636.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 116-24. In addition to the cases noted above,
several courts have addressed the question of whether a defendant/client's having filed a
disciplinary complaint against his lawyer should rise to the level of a conflict of interest which
would implicate the Cuyler and Strickland policies. Courts appear to be split on this question,
which in many ways replicates the concern about the "ratting while representing" lawyer.
See People v. Johnson, 169 111. App. 3d 800, 592 N.E.2d 345 (1992) (collecting state and federal
cases on this issue).
193, I rely here on the plain language of Model Rule 1.7(b), which states that "[a) lawyer
shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.7(b) (1992). The Rule adds an escape clause,
but it involves the client's consent after full disclosure of the factor which may affect the lawyer's
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Having disposed of these preliminary matters, we now turn to the
more complex questions: What in the model standards governing lawyer
conduct prohibits lawyer ratting, even in its cleanest and most noble
version? Using the example in the margin,m for instance, why is
not the lawyer's conduct completely within the realm of the permissible?
The lawyer is not seeking to curry favor with any prosecutor. He does
not use unlawful or surreptitious recordings, nor will he act as defense
counsel in the forthcoming prosecution of Mr. H. He is revealing an
intention to commit a criminal act and the information necessary to
prevent that act, both perfectly permissible under the strict reading of
the Model Code,19" although not, in this example, of the Model
Rules.196
zeal and effectiveness. This disclosure, of course, will be impossible in ratting contexts. This
situation is not unlike a lawyer suing a current client on an unrelated matter, which professional
ethics standards have consistently prohibited. See, e.g, MoDEL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr
Rule 1.7(a) (1992); IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978); In re Bentley, 141 Ariz. 593,
688 P.2d 601 (1984); Jeffry v. Pounds, 67 Cal. App. 3d 6, 136 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1977).
Uviller, of course, has argued that no conflict exists if actual representation is not impaired.
See Uviller, supra note 4, at 1890-91; see also supra text accompanying notes 167-75. Uviller's
underlying assumption that one can betray another person and serve him at the same time--with
no difference in the quality of the service component-is quite untenable. That proposition
seems to ignore the moral and emotional elements of a relationship, and reflects what Gerald
Postema has criticized in traditional instrumental advocacy roles--one's "practical.. .judgment
[and sense of responsibility] are effectively cut off from ordinary moral beliefs." Gerald 1.
Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 78 (1980). The
lawyer, according to Postema, then "views himself not as a moral actor but as a legal technician."
Id. at 80. For a discussion of the conflict of interest concerns which arose in Ofshe, see supra
text accompanying notes 27-52.
194. Consider the following story: I am a lawyer and a clinical supervisor at a law school
clinic. We have been representing Josif H. for several months in an effort to prevent his eviction
from his rent controlled apartment. In the course of the relationship I learn that he is receiving
federal Supplemental Security Income benefits while withholding from the Social Security
Administration (SSA) the fact that he has several thousand dollars in a bank account held by
his daughter, but respected by her as his funds. He also receives regular payments from his
daughter to help him buy things. His intentional misrepresentation of his financial status to
SSA is a crime.
I like Mr. H, but I am deeply affronted by welfare fraud. I therefore collect information
about his finances, and, while videotaping a student interaction with him in our clinic (which
videotaping has been done with his consent), I capture on videotape his admission to the crime.
I then contact SSA, unbeknownst to Mr. H, and give them the videotape and documents showing
his criminal activity. I continue to represent him in his eviction, hoping I can resolve that
matter before any criminal or administrative proceedings appear within SSA or the United States
Attorney's Office. If and when those proceedings arrive I will testify against him.
195. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1980).
196. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1992). Under the
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What precludes acceptance of our lawyer's conduct is its underlying
dishonesty. Just as with the surreptitious recording,197 the provisions
governing honesty, DR 1-102(A) (4) and Model Rule 8.4(c),'" prohibit
an interpretation of the provisions that allow for discretionary revelation,
DR 4-101(C)(3) and Model Rule 1.6(b)(1), which involve withholding
from a client the fact that such exercise of discretion is about to oc-
cur.'" The revelation is fully permitted, and may in fact be encour-
aged;' its secretiveness is neither. The revelation sections cannot
be interpreted without reference to the anti-deceit sections, and when
the two are read together only one conclusion remains: Lawyers who
opt to reveal client intended crimes must inform their clients of that
intention.
It is very interesting that of all of the commentary about lawyer
discretion to reveal intended criminal conduct of clients, nowhere has
one written about the conversation that ought to take place between
lawyer and client surrounding that revelation.2"' It is true that in perjury
contexts the lawyer's "duty to dissuade" his client before he reveals
Model Rules this fictional lawyer is far more limited in his ability to disclose client information,
but one can conceive of the "substantial bodily harm" requirement being satisfied in a different
scenario, where, for instance, the criminal activity might include child abuse or neglect.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 186-91.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 188-89.
199. Rule 1.6(b)(1) provides that "[a] lawyer may reveal such information to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary ... to prevent the client from committing a criminal
act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm."
MODEL RuL OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1992). Within the Model Code,
DR 4-101(C)(3) provides: "A lawyer may reveal ... [t]he intention of his client to commit
a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1980) (footnotes omitted).
200. I do not want to imply that revelation of the so-called "welfare fraud" in the above
hypothetical should be "encouraged." While that activity is technically a crime, and while
the lawyer certainly cannot assist a client in his misrepresentation of income, I am not about
to declare that this is the kind of "continuing crime" about which lawyers ought to blow the
whistle.
201. See KAuFMAN, supra note 152, at 143-44 (posing a hypothetical with questions about
whether a lawyer would warn a client before making a call to the police). The Kaufman
hypothetical is wonderfully intriguing, but he offers no reference to any authority which has
discussed the solution to his questions. But cf. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNNG
LAWYERS §§ 117A, 117B (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1989) (Discussion Draft provisions permitting
revelation of intended criminal or fraudulent activity in certain circumstances, but only "flollowing
an attempt by the lawyer, if feasible, to dissuade the client").
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the perjury to a judge is stressed frequently." 2 The guidance we receive
from the perjury discussions confirms my reading of the revelation
language that an attorney may not reveal and at the same time mislead
a client about that revelation.
This positive law discussion is not fully satisfactory, however, for
two reasons. First, as noted earlier, the actual language of the standards
is not free from ambiguity. In addition, positive law can be morally
troubling; thus, we ought to have a position on ratting which is satisfacto-
ry both under the standards and under moral sensibilities. With that
in mind, I choose to explore the normative considerations that rule out
ratting as an acceptable lawyering behavior.
2. The Moral Critique of Ratting
Initially, three related moral objections to ratting by lawyers present
themselves, none of which is overridden by the fact that the subject
of the ratting may himself be a criminal or engaged in unlawful activity.
This fact about the subject makes the question closer, to be sure, but
it cannot justify the profession's approval of this behavior.
First, I want to start with the fundamental objection that ratting is
deceptive, and therefore presumptively impermissible. Lying to clients,
as Lisa Lerman's study demonstrated, is common. 0 3 Because it is
common, it, along with a collection of other factors, serves as a measure
of distrust among the public about lawyers." 4 The commonalty of
client deception by lawyers imposes an obligation to be sparing in our
support of sanctioned dishonesty.
In her response to Professor Lerman's article about lawyers and lying,
Carrie Menkel-Meadow proposed the "Golden Rule of Candor," which
asks a lawyer to treat his client with the level of honesty which he would
202. See, e.g., Whiteside v. Nix, 475 U.S. 157, 106 S. Ct. 988, 89 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1986);
Carol T. Rieger, Client Perjury: A Proposed Resolution of the Constitutional and EthicalIssues,
70 MINN. L. REv. 121, 124 (1985); Charles Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 809,
846-47 (1977).
203. See Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 659 (1990).
204. Id. at 679-80; see Frederick Miller, If you Can't Trust Your Lawyer.... ?, 138 U.
PA. L. REv. 785 (1990); see also BERNARD BARBER, THE LOAGIC AND LiMITS OF TRUST 149-54
(1983).
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want himself if he were the client.2 Menkel-Meadow's proposal
is difficult to argue against; for two reasons, however, it cannot go far
enough to support the ethical prohibition on ratting. First, her Golden
Rule, by asking a lawyer to envision what he would want if he were
in the shoes of his client, might prove too much. A defendant about
to be informed upon would not want dishonesty from his lawyer, to
be sure, but he would also not want the informing at all, with or without
the disclosure. The Menkel-Meadow formula applies in her discussion
to paternalist deception where lawyers withhold information from clients
allegedly for their own good." In that context the rule applies well,
for it forces lawyers to consider from a client's perspective when and
how much, if any, paternalism is justified. Ratting, by contrast, is not
a paternalistic activity. It is not done for the benefit of the client. Ratting
is done for the benefit of third parties or the state in direct opposition
to the client's welfare. A Golden Rule cannot help very much to address
the limits of deception in that context.
The second reason why the Golden Rule cannot resolve the ethical
inquiry about the limits of deception is that the rule does not aid in a
determination of when deception might be justified. For the reasons
just described, looking to the client for that answer does not help.
However, other ways to address the deception issue exist. Sissela
Bok has done so in her ethical treatise on deception,2° and her reason-
ing supports, I believe, the thesis that the profession ought to discourage
ratting as I have defined it. Bok argues, as one might expect, that lying
is morally problematic and difficult to justify.208 In her view it is
akin to violence, and the equivalent to "an assault" on its victim."
Like violence and assault, deception may be justified, but that justification
must be considerable!1
205. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lying to Clients for Economic Gain or Paternalistic Judgment:
A Proposal for a Golden Rule of Candor, 138 U. PA. L REV. 761, 764 (1990).
206. Id. at 767.
207. SissELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CuOIcE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1989).
208. See id. at 17-31.
209. Id. at 18. Bok equates deceit with violence and describes both as "the two forms
of deliberate assault on human beings." Id.
210. Id. at 90-106. Bok suggests a three-step approach to justification: (1) ask whether
an alternative form of action will resolve the difficulty without the lie, (2) determine the reasons
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Deception and lying may be warranted, for example, in self-defense
or in a crisis, when lying serves to avoid harm which has no moral basis
or support.... To demand honesty, which otherwise is a valued good,
in cases where lying can prevent a much more serious injury and where
it is improbable to prevent the harm and respect the perpetrator's right
to truth at the same time is illogical.tm Neither of these justifications,
though, would appear to apply to ratting. The better articulated moral
defense for ratting covers two different points. The first argument is
that the victim of ratting has sacrificed his entitlement to honesty by
his use of lawyers to plan criminal activity. A second defense says
that the Government's need to address crime and to protect public safety
offers a superior rationale for the infringement of the right of the victim
to otherwise receive honest and truthful treatment. Can these two
rationales provide the level of justification needed to defend deceit?
As you might foresee, I do not believe this is so. The first argument
echoes what Bok describes as "lying to enemies., 213 She reports that
enemies are often seen as not entitled to otherwise fair treatment because
they have placed themselves outside of accepted moral practice:
[Tihe adversary is often thought to be outside the "social contract" which
otherwise obtains among human beings or at least within any one society.
The outsiders, it is held, do not, or cannot, comply with existing rules.
offered to excuse the lie, and (3) expose those reasons to her list of "publicity" or what reasonable
persons would say about such lies. Id. at 105-06.
211. Id. at 108-09.
212. See BOK, supra note 207, at 32-46, 108-09; see also Christine M. Korsgaard, The
Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFW. 325, 337-39 (1986).
213. See BOK, supra note 207, at 134-45. Other possible rationales alluded to in Bok's
treatise might be applied to lawyer ratting. One is the idea of "Lying to Liars." Id. at 123-33.
A defender of ratting might argue that one's client's unlawful behavior might justify deception
toward him. This argument seems to falter. Not only does the analogy not apply cleanly-Bok's
chapter concerns when one is lied to, or when two agree to be deceptive to one another (e.g.,
card games), neither of which approaches ratting-but Bok also rejects using the deceived's
status as a liar as any independent reason for lying. Id. at 132-33. But see Korsgaard, supra
note 212, at 339 (finding deception a plausible ground for deception in kind).
A second Bok category applicable here might be "The Noble Lie," or "Lies for the Public
Good." See BOK, supra note 207, at 165-81. What has been labelled "noble ratting" might
seek justification along those lines. For reasons similar to those addressed in the text, Bok
expresses especial discomfort with the noble lie. She applies her "publicity" test to such conduct
and concludes that one's motive to accomplish noble aims would be seen, without more, as
a weak and dangerous basis on which to justify lying. Id. at 172-75, 179-81.
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They do not uphold their end of any social arrangements from which
they benefit, and can therefore not expect the ordinary protections 1"
This view of enemies is common, but it is not a persuasive view. Bok
urges "exceptional caution" in relying on this ground as support for
lying because it eludes the usual moral inquiry about the harm of lying
versus the harm of truth-telling. 2 s This view encourages fuzzy thinking
about precisely who is the enemy and whether that person has in fact
rejected conventional moral discourse,216 and those who resort to this
excuse "fail to take into account the effects of the lies on themselves
as agents, on others why [sic] may be affected, and on general trust. 21
This last concern of Bok's has particular applicability to the legal
profession, as described below. 218
Bok's exhortation concerns treating enemies with respect and honesty
unless contrary demands succeed in overcoming this moral presump-
tion.2 19 While this teaching, if accepted, might seem to offer scant
support for ratting, Bok proceeds to announce an exception to her general
principle which ratting defenders will embrace. "[E]ven apart from
... crises," she writes, "a special case might be made for deception
in lawful, declared hostilities, as against tax evaders or counterfeit-
ers. ... ,"20 Bok's point is that in declared hostilities the victim is
far less expecting of the truth,22' and the risk of overbreadth in the
214. Id. at 138. Bok has addressed her "Lying to Enemies" Chapter directly to lawyers.
See Sissela Bok, Lying to Enemies: Lawyer's Moral Choice, 52 N.Y. ST. B.J. 552,554 (1980).
215. Bok, supra note 214, at 554 (stating, "those who contemplate action against enemies
may then throw ordinary moral inquiry to the winds").
216. See id.
217. Id.
218. See infra text accompanying notes 236-67.
219. Bok, supra note 214, at 589 ("No matter how hostile or dangerous a person, dealing
with him honestly will always be preferable to deceit.").
220. Id.
221. Id. This reasoning has been adopted by some writers on negotiation ethics in support
of an argument that in certain negotiation contexts deception ought not be prohibited because
neither side to the negotiation would expect truthfulness; therefore, there will be no "reliance"
on the falsehood. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 cmt. para.
2 (1992). For discussion of this reasoning and its implications, see Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The
Ethics of Lying on Negotiations, 75 IOWA L. REv. 1219 (1990); James J. White, Machiavelli
and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 926.
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definition of our enemies is narrowed considerably.222 Thus, while
ratting is presumptively unacceptable because of its deceitful character,
its defense can rely upon the need for deceit within public crime preven-
tion campaigns as moral support for this behavior.
That argument leads to the second moral objection to ratting which
is a deontological one at base.2 Conceding that public campaigns
against crime must rely upon deception and possess some justification
in doing so, the use of lawyers as informants violates personal trust
and intimacy in ways which other informant schemes do not, and for
that reason are more objectionable than other police deception activities
might be.
Sanford Levinson has written about the 1970s' ABSCAM investigation
and its use of informants, and in doing so he has developed insights
about informants that are of great relevance here.224 Levinson describes
three types of informants, using the Judas-Christ relationship as his
vehicle, and he compares the moral implications of the differing types.
The first type he terms "informer as snitch."22'  In this scenario, the
informer came to a relationship in good faith, and whatever trust and
intimacy which may have developed occurred honestly and without guile.
The person then genuinely "changed his mind about the duties he owed
to another person and acted thereafter to 'betray' that person. 2 2 '
By contrast, the second informer type Levinson calls the "informer
as double-self. 2 7 This type of situation contains a genuine relation-
ship, which the secret agent exploits to breach the trust of his victim.
222. The restrained definition of one's enemy is important to Bok because she sees one
of the greatest risks of the "lying to enemies" argument as the tendency to expand the class
of those who qualify as "enemies," and the resulting diminution of more carefully articulated
justifications for any deceit that might occur. See Bok, supra note 214, at 554-55.
223. The Bok arguments are a mix of deontological and utilitarian arguments. Her premise
that lying is morally unjustified is deontological-it relies less on utility and more on a recognition
of the need for honesty as a fundamental human quality. In crafting the exceptions to her premise
she relies more on utilitarian reasoning--contrary to Kant's imperative, for instance, she justifies
lying if it can save the life of an innocent victim.
224. Sanford Levinson, Under Cover: The Hidden Costs of Infiltration, in ABSCAM Emics:
MoRAL IssuEs AND DECEPTION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 43 (Gerald M. Caplan ed., 1983).
225. Id. at 48.
226. Id. (emphasis added).
227. Id. at 49.
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The "informer as double-self" resumes the relationship after choosing
to exploit it and disguises his exploitation, falsely presenting the facade
of the former genuine relationship. In the Judas example, Judas returns
to the Last Supper knowing that he is about to betray Jesus and gathering
evidence by which to do so, but he conceals the betrayal by his deceptive
impression of the former friendship.2 s
Finally, Levinson describes the third version, the "informer as wholly
false self." 29 In this case, the relationship has been unauthentic from
the very beginning. The informer insinuates himself into a position
of trust and intimacy by disguise and deceit; he never establishes a
genuine relationship and always intends exploitation.3
The three types of informers are not equivalent in their moral attributes.
With the "informer as snitch," not only can we not prohibit such genuine
changes of heart, we in fact would not want to do so. We recognize
one's freedom to disagree with prior commitments, to evolve in one's
social and moral development, and we respect the autonomy which these
informants exhibit. "31 This is not to say that as a victim we will not
feel betrayed and hurt; it is to say, though, that the pain is not one based
upon moral disenchantment.
The second and third types of informants present much more serious
moral complication. 2  Levinson argues that the second and third
types of informants are "deeply subversive of the possibility of friendship,
love and trust. This use [of such informants by the state or other
institutions] is morally equivalent to the decision to use violence; indeed
it is a kind of torture."233 The level of "violence" or "torture" involved
228. Id. at 49-50.
229. Levinson, supra note 224, at 50.
230. See id. at 50.
231. Compare the philosophical literature on the meaning of "self," including the argument
that one's self may not be continuous over time. See DEREK PARF1T, REASONS AND PERSONS
204-26 (1984). Parfit's analysis has special relevance to the inquiry about the binding effect
to be given to prior directives, such as a living will. For an application of that theory, see
generally, Alen Buchanan, Advance Directives and the Personal Identity Problem, 17 PHUL.
& PUB. AFF. 277 (1988); Rebecca Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual
Infirmities and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 373 (1986); Nancy K. Rhoden,
Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARv. L. REv. 375, 410-19 (1988).
232. See Levinson, supra note 224, at 50-52.
233. Id. at 50-51.
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is proportional to the degree of intimacy which the exploited relationship
represents. There is an ironic side-effect to Government's use of trusting
relationships to ferret out evidence of crimes. That side effect is captured
by Levinson:
To the extent that the public becomes more and more aware that people
are not at all whom they appear to be, the trust necessary for successful
infiltration will be harder to evoke (or more extreme "markers" of
trustworthiness will be required, ranging from sexual intercourse to
participation in illegal or otherwise socially stigmatic activity).
Indeed, reported cases show judges relying upon this rationale to justify
police use of intimate relationships as informant opportunities.m'
The use of lawyers as informants raises both the moral objections
Levinson describes, and questions the level of trust and intimacy which
the attorney-client relationship implies. Informants, according to both
the Bok and the Levinson reasoning, require special justification as a
result of their deceit and their exploitation of trust. When the informants
are lawyers, that justification is much greater, because much more is
at stake than the "torture" of the ratted-upon client. To develop why
special justification is necessary, I must explore, at least briefly, the
function of trust within the attorney-client interaction.
The concerns about trust capture the last of the three moral objections
to lawyer ratting. My point is that, because trust is so critical within
lawyering, a professional stance which fails to condemn client betrayal,
even betrayal which involves unseemly criminals and noble lawyers,
is particularly invidious and destructive. For this argument to succeed,
though, I must demonstrate that trust is important in the relationship.
This may be self evident, but it deserves some exploration given that
trust as documented is in fact rather low at the present. I also need
to demonstrate why prohibiting ratting is apt to bolster trust in ways
that allowing ratting would not.
234. Id. at 58.
235. See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir.) (using prostitute, who
then engaged in a sustained sexual relationship with the defendant, was not condoned but not
found so shocking as to violate due process), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 898 (1987); United States
v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.) (giving a five-year-old child $5 to inform on his mother not
violative of due process), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 903 (1980).
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It is easy to assert that trust is critical to the effective functioning
of the attorney-client relationship. Lawyers are fiduciaries, and their
role demands loyajty in order that clients might entrust their affairs to
lawyers.2m Attorney fiduciary responsibilities are repeated throughout
Professional Responsibility opinions and conflict of interest decisions,
and to craft an argument disapproving of this notion would be difficult.
Since trust and loyalty are so important, any approval of ratting and
its accompanying deceit and betrayal must be objected to inasmuch as
it tends to corrode feelings of trust and loyalty.
The argument of trust might rest on that kind of syllogism, but there
are more complex arguments here which make the syllogism questionable
-but ultimately correct. I see two concerns with a simple acceptance
of the logic, one concern regarding the first premise and another regarding
the second premise. How can we assert that trust is so important to
the profession when trust in the profession is so lacking? This is the
first concern that needs exploration. Mistrust of lawyers is increasing,
according to researchers.2 7 Lawyers left to self-regulation have fre-
quently favored the interests of lawyers over those of clients.2 Law-
yers' choice of a specialized morality, where conventional notions of
right and wrong have been replaced by perhaps justified but difficult
to comprehend "zealous advocacy" ethics, tends to increase distrust
on the part of clients.239 In the place of trust, contracts and contract-
type measures have appeared.2 ° Because lawyers cannot be trusted
236. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1980); Michael K.
McCluystal, Lawyers and Loyalty, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 367 (1992) (discussing the nature
of the lawyer's loyalty obligation).
237. See BARBER, supra note 204, at 131-35, 149-54.
238. See generally Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility,
90 HARV. L. REv. 702 (1977) (discussing the misordering of priorities in the Code of Responsibili-
ty); Deborah L. Rhode, The Rhetoric of ProfessionalReform, 45 MD. L. REv. 274 (1986) (calling
for more analysis of the relationship between the law profession and public needs or social
change); Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional
Codes, 59 TEx. L. REv. 689 (1981) (questioning the self-governance of the ABA).
239. See Bok, supra note 176, at 913.
240. For a discussion of the replacement of trust with contract-based mechanism, see generally,
Edmund D. Pellegrino, Trust and Distrust in Professional Ethics, in ETHICS, TRUST AND THE
PROFESSIONS 69, 75-76 (Edmund D. Pellegrino et al. eds., 1991) (discussing trust and the nature
of contractual relationships with professionals); Annette Baier, Trust and Antitrust, 96 ETHICS
231 (1986) (discussing the replacement of trust with contract-based mechanism). See also
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directly, clients seek protection against breaches of fiduciary duty through
mechanisms such as fee agreements, informed consent, and malpractice
tort remedies.
The gradual diminishing of trust and the inevitable increase of
protective devices, which do not assume trust as inevitable, might lead
to a conclusion that trust in fact matters less than all of the commence-
ment-speech platitudes about loyalty and fiduciary principles which
continue to be asserted.24 That conclusion would be wrong. The
commencement-speech platitudes are right this time---even if for reasons
different from those contained in the usual speeches.
Trust within professions, and particularly the professions of law and
medicine, is absolutely essential to the success of the professional's
endeavor. Robert Sokolowski describes "professions" as distinct from
other skilled and trained occupations by what clients of professionals
entrust to the professionals. u2 Sokolowski's point is that in other
specialized occupations people entrust things to the agents, and the things
entrusted (a car, a roof in need of repair, one's taxes) may well be very
significant. With professionals, however, people entrust themselves
and their futures.243 In addition, in professional relationships the client's
prudence is blended with, and inseparable from, that of the professional,
because neither can respond to the problem without the other (unlike,
again, the auto mechanic or the tax preparer). u
Professional relationships furthermore possess what Sokolowski terms
the "phenomenon of nakedness." Clients are essentially vulnerable
and need to rely upon the judgment of the person with greater expertise.
At the same time, the profession's trustworthiness has a certain "elegant
anonymity"--we must trust professionals not the way we trust friends,
who after all must earn our trust by their personal interactions with us,
JOEL F. HANDLER, LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY 100-01 (1990) (discussing the
nature of the contractual relationship versus a trusting relationship).
241. For a description of this possibility, and its refutation, see generally, Robert A. Burt,
Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEo. L. 1015 (1981).
242. Robert Sokolowski. The Fiduciary Relationship and the Nature of Professions, in ETrIcs,
TRUST AND THE PROFESSiONS 23-38 (Edmund D. Pellegrino et al. eds., 1991).-
243. Id. at 27-28.
244. Id. at 28.
245. Id.
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but without knowing the professional at all.2 " The stranger/doctor
who treats patients in the emergency room must have as much of a
patient's trust as if the doctor were someone the patient knew well.
To capture and confirm that trust is enormously difficult, though, because
at the time that clients/patients seek out professionals, they are commonly
in crisis and in distress, and their "primary being-in-the-world is ruptured
by incapacity. 2
47
These similar professional obligations and phenomena allow us to
see why trust is inevitable and necessary within lawyering, and why
replacement of that trust with contractarian substitutes is inappropriate.
The philosopher Annette Baier, in her exploration of the moral underpin-
nings of trust, argues that contracts can only substitute for trust when
the contracting parties are equally powerful.2" In professional relation-
ships the parties are seldom equally powerful, and it is inherent in the
definition of a profession that the professional has expertise which the
non-professional cannot adequately monitor. 9
Baier then stresses the vulnerability phenomenon within trusting
relationships to debunk the contractarians. Describing trust as "a three-
place predicate (A trusts B with valued thing C),"' 0 she focuses on
the phenomenology of entrusting, of leaving something of value with
another who has discretion in his handling of the valued thing. The
element of discretion is critical, and leads to the accompanying inevitabili-
ty of vulnerability:
If part of what the truster entrusts to the trusted are discretionary powers,
then the truster risks abuse of those and the successful disguise of such
246. Id. at 31.
247. Sally Gadow, Body and Self: A Dialectic, in THE HUMANrrY OF THE ILL: PHENOMENO-
LOGICAL PERsPEcrrvEs 86, 88 (Victor Kestenbaum ed., 1982).
248. Baier, supra note 240, at 246.
249. Eliot Freidson, Nourishing Professionalism, in EThics, TRUSTS AND THE PROFESSIONS
193, 194-95 (Edmund D. Pelligrino et al. eds., 1991). This is not to argue that always within
the lawyer-client relationship the lawyer is the most powerful. See generally MARC GALANTER
& THoMAs PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAw
FIRMs 16-17 (1991) (finding that historically as law firms grew they become increasingly
dependent on wealthy business clients). For purposes of this Article it does not matter if within
powerful corporate settings the client with access to the funds has great influence over the
lawyer. That influence does not diminish the significance of vulnerability and power imbalance
generally because the profession as a whole must establish the "elegant anonymity" of trust.
250. Baier, supra note 240, at 236.
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abuse. The special vulnerability which trust involves is vulnerability
to not yet noticed harm, or to disguised ill will.... To understand
the moral risks of trust, it is important to see the special sort of vulnera-
bility it introduces."'
The contractarian view ignores vulnerability and assumes that relation-
ships can be negotiated and protected by agreements. That view,
according to Baier, is historically a male one and conflicts with the view
of human interaction which has been described as female, and which
understands the contextual interdependence of the truster and the
trusted.2 2  Recognizing vulnerability, interdependence, and power
imbalances means rejecting the arguments that trust does not matter.
The "ethos of distrust," as Edmund Pellegrino describes it,2 4 is empiri-
cally impossible and professionally irresponsible. Professions must
recognize the importance of trust at the same time that they struggle
against the forces which leave their clients and patients mistrustful.
Clients, then, have no choice but to repose trust in their lawyers.
The profession has an obligation to nurture that trust,2 s and each
professional has an equivalent obligation to his profession to "act to
preserve the profession.
' '2S6
If trust indeed is critical to the legal profession's success as a profes-
sion, the question remains whether a ban on ratting tends to support
or to inhibit the achievement of that goal. As with the first premise,27
the simple logic says yes, that ratting only creates increased distrust.
Once again, my position is that the simple logic is in fact correct, even
if it is a bit less simple.
Ratting involves disclosing crimes and wrongdoing, and there is some
attraction to the theory that disclosing wrongdoing and minimizing harm
251. Id. at 239.
252. Id. at 247-49. See generally CAROL GILUGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VoICE (1982).
253. See Pellegrino, supra note 240, at 72-76.
254. Id. at 78.
255. See Richard M. Zaner, The Phenomenon of Trust and the Patient-Physician Relationship,
in EmIcs, TRUST & THE PROFESSIONS 45, 55-56 (Edmund D. Pellegrino et al. eds., 1991).
256. Sokolowski, supra note 242, at 36 ("Their purposes ... must be congruent with the
ends of their professions.").
257. See supra text accompanying notes 242-57.
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to innocent third parties actually fosters trust. That argument has been
made by Sissela Bok.s  Accordingly, Bok would question lawyers'
seeming inattention to the moral tensions caused by their protecting
wrongdoers without an equivalent concern for the harm suffered on
a larger social scale.2s9 In her opinion, "[t]he cumulative damage
to trust is daunting. The burden of proof, therefore, must rest heavily
on those who hold that lawyers or members of any other profession
should be free to. act in ways that violate common moral constraints.
' '2
Does this imply that lawyer ratting, which does, arguably at least, respond
to the concern about victims of wrongdoing, sustains and nurtures trust?
It does not. Ratting, even ratting that might aid innocent victims,
contravenes, rather than engenders, "common morality" in the ways
described by Sanford Levinson earlier.261 Betraying intimacy and
exploiting vulnerability and trust can hardly be said to meet the criteria
developed by Bok. On the other hand, whistleblowing, which includes
revelation of misconduct with disclosure and dialogue between lawyer
and client, does nurture and increase trust.
Robert Burt has made this argument in a noted and powerful article
from the early 1980s. In his article, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney
and Client,26 Burt argues that the need for fidelity to clients and the
need to protect the public from harm are not so inconsistent. He writes
that the
goals of public and client protection may not be in conflict, however,
and both goals may best be served through rules that lead attorneys
to disclose their client's intended illegal conduct. Close examination
of the role of trust, and of confidentiality rules in attaining trust in
attorney-client relations, will show how these two goals may be harmoni-
ous.
2 3
Burt argues that attorney-client mistrust is quite high because of the
inherent conflicts that exist within the relationship. z The conflict
258. See Bok, supra note 176, at 919-22.
259. See id. at 921.
260. Id.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 224-34.
262. Burt, supra note 241, at 1015.
263. Id. at 1018.
264. See id. at 1019-22.
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which arises is intrinsic because lawyers acquire wealth from client
misfortune, because lawyer income comes from client pocketbooks,
and furthermore because lawyers possess responsibility toward society
and toward the courts. One should note the mistrust caused by the
Blumberg-type cooptation which clients frequently perceive within the
locales where lawyers work.20
To address the intrinsic conflict, Burt argues that lawyers ought to
talk to clients more, and his suggestion is that conversation will increase
as lawyers must disclose more often and explain that disclosure.2"
His proposal is ironic and paradoxical, he concedes, for one would expect
that greater whisfleblowing will lead to greater distrust. 261 He persists
in his claim that the increased honesty and conversation can only render
the relationship more equal, more respectful, and more rich.
We do not have to embrace fully Burt's conclusions to draw from
his premises. Importantly, his recognition of increased responsibility
to report client fraud and illegality includes an honesty about that
reportage. Inherent in his suggestions are two principles which have
force here: that trust is important for the attorney-client relationship;
and that any breach of the traditional confidentiality must be accompanied
by some open acknowledgement of that breach, whether accepted or
not by the client.
V. Conclusion
Ratting is immensely damaging to any effort to foster and increase
trust in the lawyering profession. I have attempted to illustrate that,
notwithstanding important reasons for wanting to aid in preventing harm
265. See generally Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game:
Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, L. & Soc. REv., June 1967, at 15 (discussing whether
the Supreme Court's conception of the role of an attorney in a criminal case squares with social
reality).
266. Burt, supra note 241, at 1032-33. Burt's suggestion of conversation is echoed by
many who see "dialogue" as a critical but overloaded element in professional-client interaction.
See, e.g., JAY KATZ, THE SMENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984); Zaner, supra note
255, at 56-61; Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space
for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REv L. & Soc. CH. 535 (1987-88); see also ROBERT A. BURT,
TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS (1979).
267. Burt, supra note 241, at 1033.
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to victims, the legal profession must be clear that those efforts must
be accompanied by a respect and appreciation for client's moral worth
and autonomy. This means that whistleblowing must be accompanied
by conversation. And once conversation ensues, the ratting ends.
